On the day lithium carbonate plummeted nearly 12%, JPMorgan sounded the alarm on an "acute deficit": Who is misreading lithium?

What appears to be a tug-of-war between bulls and bears is, in reality, a divergence over two key calculations: energy storage demand and inventory restocking.

Core Summary ● On October 12, the front-month lithium carbonate contract on the Guangzhou Futures Exchange (GFEX) fell 11.79% in a single day, closing at RMB 104,740 per tonne, nearly halving from its peak above RMB 200,000 in mid-May. ● On the same day, circulated notes attributed to JPMorgan argued that the global lithium deficit would reach approximately 129,000 tonnes in 2026 and expand to roughly 132,000 tonnes in 2027, characterizing it as an "acute deficit year." ● These notes actually stem from an expert conference call held by JPMorgan with Benchmark Minerals' lithium analysts on September 25, not a joint outlook release by both firms. ● Institutional views are sharply divided: Goldman Sachs forecasts a surplus of 444,000 tonnes by 2028; CITIC Securities predicts a surplus of 38,000 tonnes in 2027; while JPMorgan anticipates a deficit of 132,000 tonnes in 2027. ● MineCube’s assessment: The core of the divergence lies in the accounting for energy storage demand and inventory restocking; short-term prices are driven by futures sentiment, while the directional trend for 2027 hinges on two specific timelines: the Jiǎnxiàwō project and Zimbabwean production cuts.

01 The Trigger

Two Signals on the Same Day

The lithium carbonate market experienced its most volatile day of the year on October 12. The front-month LC2701 contract on the Guangzhou Futures Exchange closed at RMB 104,740 per tonne, falling 11.79% in a single day. This marks the first time since late December last year that prices have closed below RMB 110,000. Compared to the highs exceeding RMB 200,000 in mid-May, prices have nearly halved; cumulative declines since September exceed 37%. In the spot market, high-quality battery-grade lithium carbonate has fallen below RMB 120,000 per tonne, while smelters purchasing spodumene externally face costs of approximately RMB 140,000 per tonne.

On that same day, widely circulated notes regarding JPMorgan’s lithium industry analysis presented a core view that 2027 would be an "acute deficit year" for the lithium market, with the global deficit expanding from approximately 129,000 tonnes in 2026 to roughly 132,000 tonnes in 2027. With sharp futures declines occurring simultaneously with bullish investment bank views, market confusion was inevitable: who is misreading the lithium market?

First, a correction. According to the content of the reprinted research report, this material consists of minutes from a lithium industry expert conference call released by JPMorgan on September 25, featuring Benchmark Minerals’ lithium analysts. It does not represent a "joint lithium market outlook released by JPMorgan and Benchmark," as some sources claimed. The figures of 129,000 and 132,000 tonnes are derived from JPMorgan’s proprietary models; Benchmark’s own estimates place the 2026 deficit at approximately 180,000 to 200,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE). Furthermore, these notes were published approximately two weeks prior to the sharp futures decline.

ItemJPMorgan / Benchmark ViewExplanation
2026 Supply/DemandJPMorgan deficit approx. 129,000 tonnes; Benchmark deficit approx. 180,000–200,000 tonnesLithium Carbonate Equivalent (LCE)
2027 Supply/DemandJPMorgan deficit approx. 132,000 tonnes"Acute Deficit Year"
2027 PriceAbove USD 20/kg, peaking around USD 22/kgApprox. RMB 142,000–156,000/tonne
Short-term PriceMay spike to USD 30/kgApprox. RMB 213,000/tonne; unlikely to sustain
Risk ScenarioDeficit expands to approx. 170,000 tonnesDelay at Jiǎnxiàwō; Zimbabwean production cut by half

02 Background

The Rollercoaster Ride of Lithium Prices Over the Past Year

To understand the current divergence, one must first review the trajectory of lithium prices over the past year. In May 2025, lithium carbonate futures hit a low of RMB 58,400 per tonne. Driven this year by surging energy storage demand and supply disruptions, prices rebounded significantly. By early May, the front-month contract closed at RMB 199,400 per tonne, briefly breaking through RMB 200,000 in mid-May. Prices began to retreat in September, closing at approximately RMB 119,400 on September 30; on October 12, they fell further to RMB 104,740.

TimePrice (RMB/tonne)Explanation
May 2025Approx. 58,400 (futures low)Low point of this cycle
Mid-May 2026Over 200,000 (futures)Peak for the year
September 30, 2026Approx. 119,400 (front-month)September high was approx. 162,900
October 12, 2026104,740 (front-month)Single-day drop of 11.79%
Spot Oct 12High-quality battery grade broke below 120kCosts for enterprises buying ore approx. 140k

The direct cause of the price decline is the market beginning to trade expectations of a 2027 supply surplus. A Goldman Sachs report dated October 6 projected that the global lithium market would shift from a deficit of approximately 404,000 tonnes in 2026 to a surplus of approximately 444,000 tonnes in 2028, with China’s average lithium carbonate price reaching about RMB 100,000 in 2027. CITIC Securities, meanwhile, forecast a global surplus of 38,000 tonnes in 2027 and lowered its Q4 price forecast to RMB 100,000–150,000 per tonne. MineCube previously discussed the logic behind Goldman Sachs’ model in an article on their lithium market predictions.

03 Breakdown

Why Do Opposite Conclusions Emerge for the Same Market?

Placing the forecasts of several institutions side by side reveals the magnitude of the divergence. For 2026, Goldman Sachs calculates a deficit of approximately 404,000 tonnes, Benchmark estimates 180,000–200,000 tonnes, and JPMorgan estimates 129,000 tonnes—a difference of roughly threefold. Regarding 2027–2028, Goldman Sachs and CITIC see a surplus, whereas JPMorgan sees an expanding deficit.

Institution202620272028
Goldman Sachs (Oct 6)Deficit approx. 404,000 tonnes—Surplus approx. 444,000 tonnes
JPMorgan (Sep 25)Deficit approx. 129,000 tonnesDeficit approx. 132,000 tonnes—
Benchmark (Same Call)Deficit approx. 180,000–200,000 tonnes——
CITIC Securities—Surplus approx. 38,000 tonnes—

The divergence stems primarily from two key calculations. The first is energy storage demand. According to the call minutes, Benchmark expects electric vehicle (EV) demand to reach approximately 1.3 million tonnes of LCE and energy storage demand to reach 750,000 tonnes in 2027. JPMorgan breaks down demand into EV, energy storage, and other categories at a ratio of 50:40:10, implying an energy storage figure of approximately 1.1 million tonnes, suggesting Benchmark’s energy storage numbers may be revised upward. The difference between the two firms on energy storage alone is approximately 350,000 tonnes (calculated), which is sufficient to flip the balance from "deficit" to "surplus."

The second factor is inventory restocking. Goldman Sachs’s model breaks down apparent demand into terminal consumption and inventory restocking: restocking demand reaches 462,000 tons in 2026, drops to 155,000 tons in 2027, and falls to approximately 7,000 tons by 2028. If restocking is excluded, the deficit of 404,000 tons in Goldman Sachs’s model for 2026 would instead become a surplus of approximately 58,000 tons (calculated). In other words, the tightness in 2026 viewed through Goldman Sachs’s lens is primarily driven by supply chain inventory restocking; whereas JPMorgan Chase places greater emphasis on the sustained nature of terminal energy storage demand.

Source of DivergenceBullish AssumptionsBearish Assumptions
Energy Storage DemandJPMorgan Chase: ~1.1 million tons LCE in 2027<br>Benchmark: ~750,000 tons; Goldman Sachs: Energy storage declines by 17% in 2028
Inventory RestockingInventory continues to decline, restocking persistsGoldman Sachs: Restocking drops from 462,000 tons to ~7,000 tons
Supply LagNew capacity mostly delayed until 2027Supply releases significantly within two years, with China’s upstream doubling
Policy ConstraintsRisks of disruption at Jianxiawo and in ZimbabweJianxiawo resumes production as scheduled; Zimbabwe transitions smoothly

04 Deconstruction

“Lack of Time”: JPMorgan Chase’s Supply Logic

The core argument in JPMorgan Chase’s notes is that the key constraint in the current lithium market is not resource scarcity, but a “lack of time.” Restarting mines in Western Australia that have halted operations requires months to prepare equipment and labor; new capacity at South American salt lakes takes more than a year to translate into effective supply; and most incremental capacity announced in the first half of 2026 will not come online until 2027.

China remains the marginal supplier of choice. According to the notes, approximately 30% of global lithium supply is located domestically in China, about 50% is owned by Chinese enterprises, and roughly 58% involves Chinese participation. Many of these assets have higher costs, contain more impurities, and are subject to regulatory constraints. Environmental impact assessments and tailings compliance for the Jianxiawo mine in Jiangxi have not yet been completed, with a restart expected only in the second quarter of 2027. Other lithium lepidolite assets in Jiangxi also face compliance risks and declining ore grades. Mineral Cube described the “58%” figure as covering approximately 58% of global capacity; a more accurate statement is that approximately 58% of supply involves Chinese participation.

Supply SegmentJPMorgan Chase / Benchmark AssessmentImpact on 2027
WA Mine RestartRequires months to prepare equipment and laborIncremental supply delayed
South American Salt LakesNew capacity takes over a yearIncremental supply delayed
Jianxiawo (Jiangxi)EIA and tailings compliance incomplete; restart expected Q2 2027Supply constrained in H1
ZimbabweAnnual capacity of ~1–1.2 million tons SC5 concentrate, ~130,000–160,000 tons LCE; Arcadia’s lithium sulfate covers only ~half2027 production expected flat
North AmericaBottlenecks lie in midstream conversion and cathode materials; Thacker Pass leads other projects by ~one yearActual industry chain may not materialize until the 2030s
Sodium-ion BatteriesComplementary product; penetration rate cap of ~10% after ~10 yearsLimited impact on lithium demand

Zimbabwe is a risk point particularly emphasized by JPMorgan Chase. Mineral Cube previously discussed this in an article regarding Zimbabwe’s lithium concentrate export ban, noting that the country will prohibit lithium concentrate exports starting January 2027. Currently, only Huayou Cobalt’s Arcadia lithium sulfate plant has achieved production. The notes estimate that this plant can cover only about half of the annual capacity; if the ban remains in effect, the remaining output faces interruption risks. JPMorgan Chase estimates that combined supply from Jianxiawo and Zimbabwe in 2027 will be approximately 260,000 tons. In a risk scenario, if Jianxiawo restarts in Q2 and Zimbabwe experiences a quarterly production cut of approximately half, this would create a downside risk of approximately 40,000 tons in lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE), potentially widening the deficit to approximately 170,000 tons.

05 Comparison

What Are Futures Trading?

If JPMorgan Chase is correct, why did futures plummet on the same day? The answer lies in the fact that futures and fundamentals trade different time horizons. The main futures contract LC2701 corresponds to delivery in January next year, trading expectations for 2027; however, institutional views on 2027 are precisely where the greatest divergence exists. Goldman Sachs and CITIC’s expectations of oversupply, combined with downstream caution following the National Day holiday and concerns about destocking in energy storage, caused futures to fall first.

On the other hand, spot prices have shown relative resilience. When futures dropped on September 23, the intermediate spot price for battery-grade lithium carbonate fell by only 250 RMB, causing the basis to widen continuously. On October 12, when futures broke below 110,000 RMB, spot prices remained near 120,000 RMB, while smelters purchasing spodumene faced costs of approximately 140,000 RMB. Futures prices have already fallen below the cost line for a significant portion of capacity, which inherently suppresses supply release and acts as a support factor for prices.

UBS’s scenario analysis provides another reference: under the base case, lithium demand grows by 15% and supply by 22% in 2027, with lithium carbonate prices around 120,000 RMB; under the downside case, demand grows by 10% and supply by 30%, with prices around 78,800 RMB; under the upside case, demand grows by 20% and supply by 10%, with prices around 170,000 RMB. The assumptions for the upside case—stoppages in Jiangxi and strict enforcement of the ban in Zimbabwe—are consistent with the direction of JPMorgan Chase’s risk scenario.

UBS ScenarioDemand GrowthSupply GrowthLithium Carbonate Price (10k RMB/ton)
Downside10%30%~7.88
Base15%22%~12
Upside20%10%~17

06 Judgment

The Divergence Itself Is the Answer

Mineral Cube’s assessment is that the bullish-bearish divergence in the lithium market essentially stems from differing assumptions regarding energy storage demand and inventory restocking rhythms. Short-term prices are dominated by futures sentiment and long-term oversupply expectations, while the directional trend for 2027 depends on two key milestones: Jianxiawo and Zimbabwe.

First, the short-term drop in futures has already priced in much of the negative outlook. On October 12, the main contract fell to 104,740 RMB, which is below the approximate 140,000 RMB cost for enterprises purchasing ores externally, and close to the average price of approximately 100,000 RMB for 2027 projected by Goldman Sachs. Based on JPMorgan Chase’s price framework of above $20/kg for 2027 (approximately 142,000 RMB), the current futures price is approximately 26% lower than its lower bound (calculated). Given the massive divergence among multiple institutions regarding 2027, there is limited room for further sharp declines, but a rebound will also require new catalysts.

Second, energy storage is the largest variable determining the direction. JPMorgan Chase and Benchmark differ by approximately 350,000 tons in their energy storage demand forecasts; this gap exceeds the deficit or surplus scale predicted by any single institution. Global energy storage battery shipments maintained high growth this year, reaching approximately 725 GWh from January to August, a year-on-year increase of approximately 97%. If energy storage maintains high growth rates in 2027, JPMorgan Chase’s deficit judgment will be closer to reality; if energy storage destocking extends and growth slows significantly, the oversupply judgments of Goldman Sachs and CITIC are more likely to materialize.

Third, two time points warrant close tracking. The first is the export ban in Zimbabwe effective January 1, 2027; the second is the resumption of production at Jianxiawa. JPMorgan expects Jianxiawa to restart only in the second quarter of 2027, whereas the market had previously anticipated an earlier resumption. If both supply sources are constrained simultaneously in the first half of 2027, the tightness in the lithium market will exceed what is currently reflected in futures prices; conversely, if Zimbabwe transitions smoothly and Jianxiawa resumes production ahead of schedule, expectations of oversupply will be further reinforced.

Fourth, for the industry chain, current price levels are beginning to test costs. Smelters purchasing spodumene concentrate find it difficult to achieve profitability at futures prices near RMB 100,000 per tonne, while high-cost lepidolite capacity is also under pressure. If prices remain at this level for an extended period, some capacity will voluntarily reduce output, which aligns with the cyclical pattern of "price-driven supply repair." From this perspective, the sharp decline in futures prices itself is accumulating conditions for the next upward cycle.

07 Outlook

Three Key Items to Monitor Next

Tracking Point 1: Shipment volumes and production schedules for energy storage batteries. Energy storage is the core area of divergence between bulls and bears in the current lithium market. Q4 production schedules for energy storage cells, the progress of converting energy storage project tenders into installations, and changes in forecasts for energy storage installed capacity in 2027 will determine which side’s model more closely reflects reality.

Tracking Point 2: The Zimbabwe ban and Jianxiawa’s environmental impact assessment (EIA). Starting January 1, 2027, Zimbabwe will prohibit the export of lithium spodumene concentrate. Whether detailed rules regarding toll processing and transition arrangements are issued, along with progress on Jianxiawa’s EIA and tailings compliance, represent the two largest variables for supply in the first half of 2027.

Tracking Point 3: Futures-spot basis and smelter operating rates. Currently, futures prices are significantly below spot prices, with the basis widening continuously. If smelters reduce output due to losses, spot prices will stabilize first; the direction of basis convergence will signal a turning point in prices. Changes in the operating rates of smelters purchasing external ore serve as a direct window to observe this process.

For the lithium industry chain, divergent institutional forecasts are not uncommon, but scenarios where predictions for the same year differ by a factor of three and move in opposite directions are rare. This itself indicates that the lithium market is in a phase of high uncertainty. In such phases, it is more important to monitor the key variables that drive conclusions than to bet on the conclusions of any single institution.

The greater the divergence, the more one must focus on the variables rather than the conclusions.

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