Bahrain Aluminum Production Recovers to 80%, but the “Post-War” Era for Gulf Aluminum Is Far From Over

The CEO of Bahrain Aluminum describes it as a “minor, slight attack,” while Emirates Global Aluminium (EGA) will not reach full production until Q1 2027—the same conflict has yielded vastly different outcomes for three Gulf aluminum plants.

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Key Takeaways
On September 16, Ali Al Baqali, CEO of Bahrain Aluminum (Alba), stated at the Fastmarkets Aluminum Conference in Budapest that the company’s current aluminum production is approximately 1.3 million tons per year, recovering to about 80% of its pre-war capacity of 1.6 million tons. Exports are routed through Jeddah Port in Saudi Arabia and Sohar Port in Oman.<br><br>Alba was struck by Iranian missiles in March; the CEO characterized this as a “small-scale, minor attack.” Losses have been repaired and are covered by insurance, with recovery remaining relatively stable. In contrast, the Al Taweelah facility of Emirates Global Aluminium (EGA), also attacked on the same day, suffered “significant damage,” leading to an emergency shutdown of the entire plant.<br><br>The fates of the three major Gulf aluminum plants diverged sharply: Alba has recovered to 80% capacity, Qatar Aluminum (Qatalum) has stabilized at 60% since March, and EGA had only repaired 315 of its 1,262 electrolytic cells (25%) by August 26. Full production at EGA is not expected until Q1 2027.<br><br>Mineral Cube Assessment: The 80% figure is a genuine signal of recovery. However, the number of vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz daily remains in the single digits. A more accurate description of the Gulf aluminum industry’s status is not that the crisis has ended, but rather that it has “adapted to the crisis.”<br><br>A Detail Worth Remembering: To judge the repair pace of the regional supply chain, one cannot look solely at samples like Alba, which recovered fastest; one must also monitor EGA, the weakest link with the slowest repair progress.

Catalyst I: CEO States in Budapest: We Have Returned to 80% of Pre-War Levels

On Wednesday, September 16, Ali Al Baqali, CEO of Bahrain Aluminum, told media outlets during the Fastmarkets Aluminum Conference in Budapest that the company’s current aluminum production stands at an annualized 1.3 million tons, compared to a pre-war capacity of approximately 1.6 million tons. This represents a recovery to roughly 80% of pre-war levels. Products are exported to overseas markets via Jeddah, a Red Sea port in Saudi Arabia, and Sohar Port in Oman. Bahrain Aluminum claims to be the world’s largest aluminum smelter at a single site. Established in 1968 and commencing operations in 1971, it was the first aluminum smelter to come online in the Middle East, holding a pivotal position in the industry.

Al Baqali revealed further operational details: the company currently receives approximately 7,000 tons of alumina feedstock daily. He described this alternative logistics arrangement as “costly,” but noted that these costs are offset by high LME aluminum prices and spot premiums. Regarding the attack on the facility in March, Al Baqali characterized it as a “small-scale, light-intensity attack,” stating, “We sustained damage, but it has been repaired.” The company holds insurance coverage for such incidents.

Viewing the 80% figure within the context of the company’s history adds weight to the statement: Bahrain Aluminum has recently been in an expansion cycle. It had just completed $3 billion in financing for the Line 6 expansion project, which was originally the core engine for increasing the company’s capacity. Following the outbreak of war, the company faced not only the urgent repair of existing capacity but also the disruption of its entire expansion schedule. The ability to pull production back to 80% under these circumstances demonstrates significant effort in emergency logistics and production line scheduling.

Background II: On the Same Day, Two Gulf Aluminum Plants Were Hit, Yet Their Fates Differed Completely

To understand the significance of the “80% recovery” figure, one must return to the origins of the conflict. On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched airstrikes against Iran. Iran subsequently announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, prohibiting passage by foreign vessels. On March 19, the United States began aerial operations against Iranian targets, attempting to reopen the strait. For over six months thereafter, both sides engaged in a protracted tug-of-war involving ceasefires, naval blockades, attacks, and counter-attacks. A memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 promised “safe passage without fees within 60 days,” but vessels from both sides were attacked again in July, and the United States reimposed a naval blockade in August.

To date, the U.S. Congress continues to express repeated positions regarding this conflict. On September 15, the U.S. House of Representatives voted for the third time to demand an end to military operations against Iran. This indicates that the conflict, which began in February, has dragged on for nearly seven months without a true endpoint. Positions remain deadlocked. This is the broader background explaining why Gulf aluminum enterprises continue to operate under “abnormal conditions,” and why Bahrain Aluminum’s statement of “recovering to 80%” warrants separate analysis.

March 28 marked a turning point for the Gulf aluminum industry: Iranian missiles and drones struck the Khalifa Economic Zone in Abu Dhabi. The Al Taweelah facility, owned by Emirates Global Aluminium (EGA), “suffered significant damage.” All facilities, including the smelter, casting workshop, power plant, alumina refinery, and recycling plant, were forced into an emergency shutdown. Bahrain Aluminum was also attacked on the same day, but the extent of the damage was far less severe than that suffered by EGA. Both enterprises were hit on the same day, yet the losses were not on the same scale. This disparity constitutes the key background for understanding the core comparison in this article.

Breakdown III: Bypassing the Strait of Hormuz: Why Jeddah and Sohar Could Absorb This Supply Chain

Bahrain Aluminum’s choice of Jeddah and Sohar as export channels is driven by clear geographical logic: Jeddah is located on the Red Sea side of Saudi Arabia, allowing cargo to reach global markets directly without passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Sohar is situated along the coast of the Gulf of Oman, similarly enabling vessels to avoid the narrowest and highest-risk sections of the strait. While this logistics solution bypasses risks, the cost is longer voyage distances and more complex loading/unloading processes. This is the specific meaning behind Al Baqali’s description of the situation as “costly.”

More telling is the actual transit status of the Strait of Hormuz to date: according to the latest shipping data, only four vessels passed through the strait on Tuesday, a further decline from seven the previous day, well below the normal level of more than ten vessels per day prior to the conflict. This means that even though Bahrain Aluminum has pulled production back to 80% of pre-war levels, the entire regional shipping system it relies upon is far from “normalized.” The 80% production volume is built upon a still-defective logistics network.

EGA’s own recovery progress further corroborates the prevalence of this “defectiveness”: EGA’s Al Taweelah alumina refinery was also forced to shut down in March. Hydroxide production resumed on June 24, and alumina output officially resumed in early July. First-half production amounted to only 602,000 tons, nearly halving the 1.142 million tons produced in the same period last year. The refinery’s full-year 2025 production was 2.24 million tons, accounting for 46% of EGA’s total alumina requirements. If an upstream plant supplying critical raw materials to other entities faces such difficulties, the difficulty downstream smelters face in maintaining stable production is evident.

Lesson IV: Gulf Aluminum Had Just Become the “New Favorite” of Western Supply Chains Before Being Caught Off Guard by This Conflict

The most significant background to record during this verification process is that the timing of the outbreak of this conflict was a terrible coincidence for Gulf aluminum plants. In April 2024, after the US and UK excluded Russian aluminum from the deliverable scope of major exchanges such as the LME, Russian aluminum exports to Western markets plummeted by 45%, while UAE and Bahrain exports to the West increased by 26% and 15% respectively, with Gulf production becoming the preferred alternative source for Western buyers. Just as this new supply chain was being established, this conflict in February 2026 directly struck its two most critical nodes.

More ironically, the United States' own plan to eliminate import dependency has been swept up in it: In January 2026, EGA and Century Aluminum announced the formation of a joint venture (EGA holding 60%, Century Aluminum 40%), planning to invest $4 billion to build a new aluminum plant in Enola, Oklahoma, with an annual output of 750,000 tons, which will be the first new aluminum plant in the US in nearly 50 years; but with EGA's local flagship plant, Al Taweelah, suffering heavy damage, the timeline and feasibility of this flagship project, originally intended to reduce US aluminum import dependency, have instead added new uncertainties—the supply chain sought to bypass one risk point, only to collide with another.

EGA CEO Ben Kalban publicly stated after the incident in March that the Al Taweelah facility is "one of the cornerstones of the global economy," and that this accident "has caused damage to the global industry and people's well-being"—this statement somewhat explains why the US places such importance on building new aluminum plants domestically: precisely because the single-point failure risk of the Gulf supply chain has become large enough to shake global markets.

Comparison Five: Three Gulf Aluminum Plants, Three Fates

Looking at Alba, EGA's Al Taweelah facility, and Qatalum, the three main aluminum plants in the Gulf, the actual impact of the conflict on them and their recovery rhythms differ significantly:

Company/FacilityReason for ImpactCurrent Status
Alba (Alba)Hit by "minor" missile attack on March 28, compounded by alumina supply disruption due to strait blockadeProduction recovered to 80% of pre-war levels (1.3 million tons/1.6 million tons), exported via Jeddah and Sohar
EGA · Al TaweelahHit by "major damage" missile-drone attack on March 28, entire plant emergency shutdownAs of August 26, 315 out of 1,262 cells (25%) repaired, expected to reach full production in Q1 2027
Qatalum (Qatalum)Initiated controlled shutdown on March 3 due to gas supplier warning of imminent natural gas interruptionStable at approximately 60% capacity (approx. 390,000 tons/year) since March 12, no further updates seen since

It is worth adding that another EGA facility—the Dubai Jebel Ali plant—was not directly impacted, currently still operating at full load, and has already established alternative logistics channels bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. This indicates that even within the same company, different locations exhibit significant differences in risk resistance, with geography itself becoming an implicit but critical variable in this crisis.

EGA's own progress explanation is also highly reference-worthy: In April, the company estimated that full recovery would take up to 12 months; by July, the company stated that repair progress was "ahead of schedule"; the latest progress on August 26 shows that all three potlines (Potline 1, 2, 3) have been energized, but to bring all 1,262 cells back into operation requires gradual, sequential repairs. On average, each cell needs about a week after restart to reach full load. This determines that even if "ahead of schedule," overall progress advances in months rather than weeks.

Assessment Six: Mineral Cube Judgment: 80% is Real Recovery, but the "Pre-War" Reference Frame Has Changed Itself

Mineral Cube's judgment is: Alba's 80% production recovery is a real, credible signal. With relatively light damage, the company rebuilt complete logistics channels by rerouting through Jeddah and Sohar, demonstrating tangible operational capability; but placing this number against the backdrop of the Strait of Hormuz seeing only single-digit daily vessel transits, the Gulf aluminum industry as a whole is still far from true "post-war reconstruction."

A more accurate expression should be: Alba represents a state of "adapted to crisis"—using more expensive, longer logistics paths to pull production back to normal levels under existing constraints; rather than a state of "crisis resolved." True crisis resolution must wait until daily vessel transits in the Strait of Hormuz return to double digits, and EGA's Al Taweelah facility truly achieves full production. Only then will the "pre-war level" reference frame regain meaning, rather than being a relative number calculated on a compressed, distorted supply chain basis as it is now.

Looking at the progress of the three companies together yields a more nuanced judgment: The lighter the damage, the faster the recovery speed; Alba and Qatalum stabilized at around 80% and 60% respectively within months; whereas EGA, suffering severe physical damage, despite repair progress being "ahead of schedule," still requires measuring recovery cycles in units of a full year. This suggests a rule: To judge the overall rhythm of Gulf aluminum supply chain repair, one cannot just look at the fastest-recovering company, but rather should focus on the slowest-recovering bottleneck—because the actual deficit in the global aluminum supply chain is determined by the slowest link.

Outlook Seven: 3 Tracking Signals

Rather than looking solely at the recovery ratio of a single company like Alba, it is more worthwhile to establish several signals reflecting the true state of the entire regional supply chain, because single-company figures can easily mask the reality that the entire system remains fragile—

Tracking Point One: Track daily vessel transit data in the Strait of Hormuz. This is the most fundamental indicator for judging whether the entire Gulf bulk commodity logistics system has truly returned to normal, and a leading signal that reflects changes earlier than any company's production figures;

Tracking Point Two: Track EGA's published progress on Al Taweelah cell repairs. As the slowest recovering among the three Gulf aluminum plants, whether its goal of reaching full production in Q1 2027 can be fulfilled will determine when the regional supply gap will truly be filled, making it the most critical indicator for judging the repair rhythm of the entire Gulf aluminum supply chain;

Tracking Point Three: Pay attention to whether there are new developments beyond 60% capacity for Qatalum. The company has rarely updated since March; the lack of news itself is a signal requiring continuous monitoring, potentially indicating that the natural gas supply bottleneck has not yet truly been resolved.

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Returning to "pre-war levels" sounds like an endpoint, but when the entire waterway has not yet returned to normal, this percentage is more like a newly drawn starting line on a pile of ruins, rather than a finish line.

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This content is based on public information compilation and analysis, does not constitute any investment advice, the market involves risks, and decisions require caution.