While the immediate turmoil appears to have subsided, labor disputes and diesel costs are simultaneously pushing up Chile’s copper cost base.
| Key Takeaways ● On October 18, two unions at the Centinela mine approved a new collective agreement with a 94.49% approval rate, ending the strike that began on October 7 after approximately 11 days. ● The company stated that production remained normal during the strike; however, the unions reported that conventional haul trucks decreased from 67 to 25 units, warning that if the strike had continued, November output could have been halved. ● Two major labor risks in Chile were resolved within a week: the supervisory union at Escondida accepted BHP’s proposal on October 14, leading to a pullback in copper prices from their highs. ● Antofagasta maintained its 2026 production guidance but raised its pre-byproduct credit cash cost guidance to $2.60–$2.70 per pound due to elevated diesel prices. ● Mining Cube Assessment: The end of the strike has eliminated short-term supply risks, but labor premiums under high copper prices and high diesel costs are collectively raising the cost floor for Chilean copper mines. |
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01 Trigger
Wrapping Up a First-of-Its-Kind Strike
On October 18, the Distrito Centinela and Minera Esperanza unions at Chile’s Centinela copper mine jointly announced with Antofagasta plc that collective negotiations had “successfully concluded.” Of the workers who participated in the vote, 94.49% approved the new agreement, bringing an end to the strike that had lasted approximately 11 days. This marks the first strike in Centinela’s history, which began following the failure of mandatory mediation on October 7.
The conclusion of the strike unfolded through several key milestones. Voluntary mediation resumed on October 13. On the evening of October 16, both unions held meetings to present preliminary agreement terms to their members, followed by a voting process. The approval results were announced on October 18. During this period, three workers engaged in a hunger strike to exert pressure, with the core dispute centering on the unions’ demand that all workers, regardless of union affiliation, receive identical benefits. Reports indicate that the new agreement spans 36 months and includes a bonus of approximately CLP 24 million per worker, along with improvements to wages and benefits, though specific terms have not been fully disclosed.
| Date | Event | Details |
|---|---|---|
| October 7 | Strike Begins | Mandatory mediation fails; 709 employees participate |
| Around October 13 | Resumption of Voluntary Mediation | Regional Labor Bureau intervenes |
| October 16 | Unions Present Preliminary Agreement | Strike enters final phase |
| October 17–18 | Member Voting | Approval rate of 94.49% |
| October 18 | Both Parties Announce Agreement Effective | Strike ends, lasting approximately 11 days |
In our analysis of the Centinela strike published on October 11, we assessed it as a limited-scale supply event, noting that the real uncertainty lay with Escondida, and that high copper prices themselves would continue to elevate the risk of labor conflicts. One week later, the first two assessments have proven accurate, while the third is corroborated by cost data.
02 Background
Did Production Actually Decline?
Accounts regarding the impact of the strike on production differ sharply between labor and management. Antofagasta stated that production remained at normal levels during the strike, having no negative impact on output, with full-year production expectations unchanged. Conversely, the unions claimed that average conventional haul truck operations dropped from 67 to 25 units during the strike, while autonomous haul trucks operated at 17 units (compared to a normal level of 21). With union members covering over 50% of critical equipment operators and more than 60% of maintenance personnel, they warned that impacts would materialize in November if the strike had continued, potentially halving output.
| Metric | During Strike | Normal Level |
|---|---|---|
| Number of Striking Workers | 709 people, approx. 22% of own workforce | — |
| Conventional Haul Trucks Operating | Average approx. 25 units | Approx. 67 units |
| Autonomous Haul Trucks Operating | Approx. 17 units | Approx. 21 units |
| Total Haul Trucks (Estimated) | Approx. 42 units, approx. 48% of normal | Approx. 88 units |
| Company Statement | Production remained normal | Full-year expectations unchanged |
| Union Statement | If prolonged, November output could be halved | — |
These two narratives are not necessarily contradictory. Based on union data, the total number of haul trucks operating during the strike was approximately 42 units, representing roughly 48% of normal levels (estimated). This primarily impacted mining transport and waste stripping operations. Meanwhile, the concentrator plant could maintain operations using existing ore stockpiles. Therefore, in the first two weeks of the strike, copper output remained largely unaffected. The strike ended within 11 days, precisely before the stockpiles were exhausted, which was key to the company’s ability to maintain output. The cost of this outcome was delayed stripping progress, requiring additional operational volume subsequently to catch up.
03 Breakdown
Antofagasta Q3 Report: Production Recovers, Costs Rise
During the strike, Antofagasta released its Q3 production report on October 15. Group copper production in Q3 reached 151,900 tonnes, a 7.0% quarter-on-quarter increase; cumulative production for the first three quarters was 436,900 tonnes, down 8.3% year-on-year. Specifically, Los Pelambres produced 79,300 tonnes in Q3, up 17.5% quarter-on-quarter, driven mainly by recovery after weather events in July and the consumption of approximately 7,000 tonnes of inventory. Centinela produced 46,800 tonnes in Q3, down 3.1% quarter-on-quarter. The company maintained its 2026 copper production guidance of 625,000–655,000 tonnes and issued its first-ever 2027 guidance of 630,000–690,000 tonnes.
| Metric | Q3 | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Group Copper Production | 151,900 tonnes, +7.0% QoQ | First three quarters: 436,900 tonnes, -8.3% YoY |
| Los Pelambres | 79,300 tonnes, +17.5% QoQ | Includes consumption of approx. 7,000 tonnes inventory |
| Centinela | 46,800 tonnes, -3.1% QoQ | Concentrate: 32,300 tonnes; Cathode copper: 14,500 tonnes |
| Zaldívar | 7,100 tonnes, -18.4% QoQ | Cash cost: $4.81/lb, +29% QoQ |
| Antucoya | 18,800 tonnes, +8.0% QoQ | Cash cost: $2.70/lb |
| Realized Copper Price | $6.79/lb, +3.3% QoQ | First three quarters average: $6.43/lb, +40.7% YoY |
A mid-term focal point for Centinela is the second concentrator. According to the Q3 report, the primary crusher for this project has begun preliminary operation, the long-distance conveyor belt achieved rated speed during testing, and key parts of the material handling system completed linked empty-load tests. Commissioning is scheduled to be completed according to plan in 2027. Antofagasta’s 2027 production guidance of 630,000–690,000 tonnes exceeds the 2026 guidance, with the incremental volume largely dependent on this project. Stable labor relations are equally important for the smooth commissioning of new projects.
What needs to be corrected is that some overseas reports claimed Antofagasta’s Q3 production was 143,900 tonnes, a year-on-year decline of 19%, with full-year guidance lowered. According to the company’s original report released on October 15, Q3 production was 151,900 tonnes, and full-year production guidance remained unchanged; it was the cost guidance that was raised.
The pressure to meet the full-year target is not insignificant. With cumulative production of 436,900 tonnes in the first three quarters, achieving the guidance range of 625,000–655,000 tonnes requires Q4 production of approximately 188,100–218,100 tonnes, which is roughly 24%–44% higher than Q3 (calculated). If the strike extends into November, this target faces significant risk. From this perspective, the strike ending within 11 days is crucial for Antofagasta to achieve its full-year guidance.
| Calculated Item | Value (Calculated) | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Cumulative Production (First Three Quarters) | 436,900 tonnes | Disclosed by the company |
| Full-Year Guidance | 625,000–655,000 tonnes | Unchanged |
| Required Q4 Production | Approx. 188,100–218,100 tonnes | Guidance minus first three quarters |
| Increase Relative to Q3 | Approx. 24%–44% | Q3 production was 151,900 tonnes |
| 2027 Production Guidance | 630,000–690,000 tonnes | First-time release |
04 Breakdown
It is costs that are truly rising.
The most noteworthy change in the Q3 report is the upward revision of cost guidance. Antofagasta raised its 2026 cash cost guidance before by-product credits from $2.40–$2.60 per pound to $2.60–$2.70 per pound, citing high global diesel prices; net cash cost guidance after by-product credits remains at $1.15–$1.35 per pound, and capital expenditure guidance remains at $3.4 billion. The company also noted that rising sulfuric acid prices since the beginning of the year have further increased unit costs.
Labor agreements are also driving up costs. Zaldívar completed a three-year labor agreement in Q3, causing quarterly cash costs to rise to $4.81 per pound, a 29% quarter-on-quarter increase. The new agreement at Centinela includes a substantial signing bonus and improved compensation and benefits, the costs of which will be reflected gradually over the coming quarters. MineCube previously judged in an article on IEA diesel shortages that high diesel costs would become a "new constant" in mining companies' 2027 budgets; Antofagasta’s cost increase is precisely an example of this judgment.
| Cost Item | Change | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Cash Costs Before By-Product Credits (2026) | Raised from $2.40–$2.60/lb to $2.60–$2.70/lb | High diesel prices |
| Net Cash Costs (2026) | Maintained at $1.15–$1.35/lb | Offset by by-product revenue |
| Capital Expenditure (2026) | Maintained at $3.4 billion | Excluding Zaldívar |
| Zaldívar Q3 Cash Costs | $4.81/lb, up 29% qoq | Three-year labor agreement |
| Sulfuric Acid | Increased unit costs since start of year | Tight sulfur supply |
05 Comparison
Within one week, two major risks were sequentially resolved.
Four days before the end of the Centinela strike, another major labor risk in Chile had already been resolved. On October 14, the second union representing supervisors and employees at BHP’s Escondida copper mine accepted the company’s final proposal with approximately 64% support, signing a 36-month contract, thereby avoiding a strike originally scheduled to begin the following day. If this union, comprising approximately 1,020 people, had struck, it would have directly impacted operations at the world’s largest copper mine.
| Mine | Event | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Escondida (BHP) | Vote after mediation failure between supervisors/employees second union | ~64% support on Oct 14, accepting 36-month contract |
| Centinela (Antofagasta) | Two unions struck for approx. 11 days | 94.49% voted in favor on Oct 18, strike ended |
| Zaldívar (Antofagasta) | Completed three-year labor agreement in Q3 | Quarterly cash costs rose 29% qoq |
| El Teniente (Codelco) | Operations suspended after landslide accident | Not resumed as of Oct 15 |
Following the resolution of these two major risks, copper prices subsequently retreated. On October 14, LME three-month copper contracts closed near $14,630 per tonne, touching an intraday high of $14,695, close to the historical peak of $14,875 set in September. On October 15, influenced by US inflation exceeding expectations, rising rate hike expectations, and profit-taking following the Escondida agreement, LME copper fell 0.9% to $14,360 per tonne. However, Codelco’s El Teniente copper mine remains shut down following the landslide accident, and LME copper inventory stands at approximately 232,000 tonnes, indicating that non-US markets remain tight.
It is also necessary to observe that supply disruptions in copper mines this year have not been as severe as the market imagined. Panmure Liberum estimates that mine disruptions in 2025–2026 amount to approximately 350,000–400,000 tonnes of copper metal, equivalent to only 30%–50% of the disruption reserves disclosed by various institutions, and believes that current copper price drivers are more likely speculative and financial factors. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s copper exports exceeded 150,000 tonnes in August. These data suggest that after the erosion of the strike premium, copper prices will become more sensitive to macroeconomic and liquidity conditions.
| Copper Price & Inventory | Value | Time |
|---|---|---|
| LME Three-Month | Approx. $14,630/t, intraday $14,695/t | Oct 14 |
| LME Historical High | $14,875/t | September |
| LME Three-Month | $14,360/t, down 0.9% | Oct 15 |
| LME Copper Inventory | Approx. 232,000 tonnes | Oct 14 |
| Antofagasta Realized Copper Price (Q3) | $6.79/lb | Q3 2026 |
06 Assessment
Supply risks resolved, cost floor rising.
MineCube’s assessment is: The end of the Centinela strike has eliminated short-term supply risks, but labor premiums under high copper prices and high diesel costs are pushing up the overall cost curve for Chilean copper mines; short-term copper prices have lost a support factor, while the medium-term cost floor is rising.
First, copper prices have lost the "strike premium" in the short term. Labor risks at Escondida and Centinela were sequentially resolved within a week, significantly alleviating supply concerns that had previously pushed copper prices close to historical highs. Coupled with US inflation exceeding expectations and rising rate hike expectations, copper prices may remain volatile in the short term. The shutdown of El Teniente and tight non-US inventories provide certain support for copper prices.
Second, labor and capital costs are rising systematically. High copper prices mean that mines are generating substantial profits, leading to increased demands from workers for a share of these profits; signing bonuses and salary increases have risen accordingly. Following the Zaldívar labor agreement, costs rose by 29% quarter-on-quarter, and new agreements at Escondida and Centinela also include significant bonuses. According to industry data, the number of collective bargaining rounds in Chile in 2026 is significantly higher than in 2025, indicating that the rise in labor and capital costs will be a continuous process.
Third, diesel costs represent another upward-shifting cost line. Antofagasta’s adjustment of its cost guidance due to high diesel prices aligns with Rio Tinto’s observation that increased diesel usage raised unit costs in the Pilbara region, as well as the IEA’s forecast that diesel tightness will persist through 2027. For Chilean copper mines, which are predominantly open-pit operations with high diesel intensity, this is an unavoidable cost factor.
Fourth, rising costs imply that the floor for copper prices is being elevated. When labor and energy costs rise simultaneously, the break-even line for marginal mines shifts upward, meaning that copper price declines will encounter cost support earlier. This trend, combined with the long-term trajectory of declining ore grades at Chilean copper mines and limited new supply, constitutes the medium-term cost floor for copper prices.
07 Outlook
Three Key Areas to Monitor
Tracking Point 1: Centinela’s stripping progress and Q4 production. During the strike, the number of haul trucks operating was halved, causing stripping progress to lag behind schedule. The company needs to catch up on operational volume in the fourth quarter. To meet its full-year guidance, Antofagasta needs to produce approximately 188,100 to 218,100 metric tons in Q4. The Q4 report, to be released in January next year, will provide the answer.
Tracking Point 2: El Teniente’s resumption of production. Codelco’s El Teniente is one of Chile’s largest underground copper mines. The duration of the shutdown following the landslide accident and the pace of resuming production remain the greatest uncertainties in current Chilean copper supply.
Tracking Point 3: Mining companies’ 2027 cost guidance. Antofagasta will provide its 2027 cost and capital expenditure guidance in its Q4 report next January. The impact of labor agreements and diesel prices on costs will be quantified in this guidance, providing a basis for assessing the cost floor for copper prices.
For domestic copper smelters, this strike did not result in an actual reduction in concentrate supply. The trend in treatment charges (TCs) will continue to depend primarily on the overall growth rate of global mine supply and the negotiation of year-end long-term contracts. The rising costs at Chilean mines will make mining companies more insistent on lower treatment charges during these long-term contract negotiations.
For the copper industry chain, the end of the Centinela strike represents a short-term negative factor but also serves as a medium-term warning: in an era of high copper prices, supply risks stem not only from strikes themselves but more significantly from the continuously rising costs underlying those strikes.
Strikes will end, but costs will not reverse.
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