Countries are scrambling to retain scrap copper,
but what remains may not be usable.
While it appears that multiple nations are tightening exports,
compliant scrap copper is being repriced.
| Key Takeaways ● On October 26 at the International Recycling Bureau (BIR) conference in Malaga, industry insiders warned that export controls on recycled metals would lead to four consequences: reduced export channels, lower local scrap prices, weakened incentives for recycling complex scrap, and a contraction of investment capital in the sector. ● The most significant new development lies with the EU: Starting May 21, 2027, non-OECD countries not included in an authorized list will no longer be permitted to receive relevant non-hazardous waste from the EU; the draft published in September did not grant authorization for metal scrap to India, Malaysia, Thailand, or Vietnam, and China was not on the application list. ● Measures by the United States and South Africa are not new policies: The U.S. requirement that 25% of high-quality scrap copper be sold domestically stems from the July 2025 Copper 232 announcement, but detailed rules remain unclear; South Africa’s scrap metal export tax has been levied since August 2021. ● In 2025, EU exports of copper scrap to China amounted to approximately 310,000 tons, representing over 10% of China’s annual scrap copper imports (estimated); in September this year, China’s imports of scrap copper from Spain increased by 110.7% year-on-year, indicating clear signs of rush shipments. ● Mine Cube Assessment: Export restrictions alter the flow and price structure of scrap copper, rather than the global total volume. From 2027 onwards, compliant, traceable high-grade scrap copper will become more expensive; European brass scrap may face accumulation; and China’s import sources will further tilt towards Southeast Asia and OECD countries. |
|---|
01 The Trigger
Warnings from a Recycling Conference
The BIR World Recycling Conference was held in Malaga, Spain, from October 25 to 27. During the non-ferrous metals session on the 26th, Frank Potthoff, Professor at the University of Applied Sciences Jena, presented a research report on trade barriers and recycled copper. This report was completed by him and researchers from the Fraunhofer Institute for a German association of circular metals. He outlined four potential consequences of export controls: First, a reduction in export channels raises questions about whether domestic processing capacity can absorb the volume; Second, local scrap prices fall, allowing processors to obtain cheaper raw materials, but compressing the income and profits of recyclers; Third, collecting and sorting complex scrap becomes less economically viable; Fourth, industry liquidity declines, reducing the funds available for expanding recycling capacity.
A set of data presented at the meeting best illustrates the issue. In 2025, copper alloy scrap, primarily brass, accounted for 41.7% of the EU’s copper scrap exports, with 80% of these alloy scraps purchased by China and India. The head of ACIN, a Spanish recycling company, stated at the conference that there are few buyers for brass within the EU; clean material sells well in Europe, while low-grade material is difficult to transact. He expressed concern that if brass exports were halted, recyclers’ yards would become filled with brass.
| Item | Data |
|---|---|
| EU Exports of Copper Scrap to China in 2025 (HS 7404) | Approximately 309,900 tons, accounting for 47.8% of EU exports outside the region |
| Total EU Copper Scrap Exports Outside the Region in 2025 | Approximately 648,000 tons (estimated) |
| Proportion of Alloy Type (primarily Brass) | 41.7%, approximately 270,000 tons (estimated) |
| Proportion of Alloy Type Purchased by China and India | 80%, approximately 216,000 tons (estimated) |
| EU Copper Scrap Exports in 2023 | 672,000 tons, with approximately 45% flowing to China |
Note: The tonnage figures in the table are approximate values calculated by Mine Cube based on public proportions; the statistical basis for EU export statistics differs from that of China’s Customs import statistics.
The general direction in the source material—that "multiple countries are introducing export restrictions and retaining copper scrap"—is correct, but it is necessary to distinguish between new developments and existing policies. New developments are primarily centered on the EU: A draft authorized list was published in September, public consultation ended on October 16, and the first list must be finalized before November 21. The U.S. domestic sales requirements and South Africa’s export tax are pre-existing policies, with no substantial new actions taken this year. Viewing these events together, the only measure with a clear timeline that will directly alter trade flows is the EU’s initiative.
02 Background
Scrap Copper Becomes a Strategic Resource
The sudden attention paid to scrap copper by various countries is driven by tightening supplies of primary copper. Potthoff’s report indicates that approximately one-third of global copper production raw materials in 2024 came from recycled copper; by 2040, global copper demand is expected to reach 42 million tons, roughly 50% higher than current levels. Pressure at the mining end is already evident: In mid-August this year, the weekly spot processing fee index for imported copper concentrate fell to approximately negative $175 per ton, meaning smelters not only received no processing fees for handling a ton of ore but had to pay subsidies. As primary raw materials become increasingly expensive, scrap copper has transformed from a freely tradable commodity into a strategic resource that nations wish to retain locally.
| Region | Measure | Status |
|---|---|---|
| EU | Non-OECD countries must be on an authorized list to receive relevant waste | Effective from May 21, 2027 |
| USA | 25% of high-quality scrap copper must be sold domestically; exports subject to licensing | Announced July 2025; details unclear |
| South Africa | Levies export tax on scrap metal; previously suspended copper scrap exports twice | Export tax effective from August 2021 |
| South Korea | Black and non-ferrous scrap metals previously exempted must be declared for export | Expected to start January 1, 2027 |
| Japan | Recycled materials to account for approx. 30% of domestic refined copper production by 2030 | Circular Economy Plan 2026 |
| India | Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) system for non-ferrous metal scrap | Effective from April 2026 |
| UAE | Charges 400 Dirhams per ton for copper scrap exports | Current policy |
| Malaysia | Complete ban on electronic waste imports | Effective from February 2026 |
The motivations behind these measures vary. The EU emphasizes environmental standards and supply security for secondary raw materials; the U.S. links high-quality scrap copper to national security and domestic smelting capacity; South Africa initially sought to combat theft of cables and railway infrastructure while providing cheaper raw materials to local foundries; South Korea’s declaration system focuses on transparency and does not prohibit exports; Japan pursues an investment route, planning to mobilize approximately 1 trillion yen toward critical minerals and metal recycling. While the methods differ, the direction is consistent: keeping as much primary and secondary resource within borders as possible.
South Africa was one of the earliest countries to regulate scrap metal exports, and its experience has been the most tortuous. In July 2020, South Africa fully suspended scrap metal exports for two months; starting August 1, 2021, an export tax on scrap metal officially replaced the previous price-preference system, which required exporters to sell to local buyers at a discount prior to export; in December 2022, citing the need to combat theft, South Africa suspended exports of copper and copper alloy scrap for six months, extending it by another six months in June 2023. At the time, the EU formally reminded South Africa that such export bans might conflict with its WTO obligations; the local recycling association also publicly opposed the ban, arguing that it primarily benefited large enterprises. The source material lists South Africa as a country "introducing" an export tax, whereas this policy has actually been in effect for over five years.
03 Breakdown
How Is the EU Closing This Gate?
The EU’s instrument is the revised Waste Shipment Regulation (EU) 2024/1157, adopted in April 2024, with new rules becoming applicable from May 21, 2026. The core change concerns exports to non-OECD countries: starting November 21, 2026, the export of non-hazardous plastic waste to non-OECD countries will be fully prohibited; from May 21, 2027, other non-hazardous wastes may only be exported to countries included on an authorized list. Authorization is granted on a case-by-case basis per waste category; inclusion on the list does not imply that all types of waste can be imported.
| Time | Milestone |
|---|---|
| April 11, 2024 | Revised Waste Shipment Regulation adopted |
| May 21, 2026 | New rules become applicable; regulatory and audit requirements tightened |
| September 18, 2026 | European Commission publishes draft authorized list |
| October 16, 2026 | Deadline for public consultation on the draft |
| Before November 21, 2026 | First authorized list for non-OECD countries finalized |
| End of 2026 (target) | Proposed authorization act imposing further export restrictions |
| May 21, 2027 | Unauthorized countries no longer permitted to receive relevant wastes |
The results of the September draft were stricter than market expectations. A total of 32 non-OECD countries and regions submitted applications, but regarding metal scrap, only Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine were assessed as meeting the requirements; India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan (China), Saudi Arabia, Oman, Pakistan, Egypt, Morocco, Bangladesh, among others, did not receive authorization for metal scrap. India was approved for several other waste categories, but not for metal scrap. The European Commission cited the reason that metal scrap may contain heavy metals, posing environmental risks during crushing, smelting, and refining processes; importing countries must demonstrate that their environmental and health protection levels are equivalent to those of the EU.
| Category | Country/Region |
|---|---|
| Metal Scrap Authorized (Draft) | Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine |
| Metal Scrap Not Authorized (Draft) | India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan (China), Saudi Arabia, Oman, Pakistan, Egypt, etc. |
| Not Appearing on Application List | China |
| Exempt from List Constraints | OECD members, e.g., Turkey, Japan, South Korea |
Note: The draft has not yet been finalized; the list will be updated at least every two years, and countries not approved may reapply after submitting supplementary materials.
China is not an OECD member and did not appear on the public application list. If the final list remains unchanged, after May 21, 2027, green-listed copper scrap from the EU will no longer be able to be directly exported to mainland China through existing channels. Even when exporting to OECD countries, EU exporters must arrange independent audits of overseas receiving facilities, and the EU can monitor or even suspend exports posing environmental risks.
There is a second gate beyond the list. According to Reuters, citing statements from the office of EU Executive Vice-President Jourova, the European Commission is drafting an authorization act to further prohibit waste exports to non-OECD countries, with exceptions reserved only for certain EU candidate countries. This act replaces the previous proposal to impose export tariffs solely on aluminum scrap, targeting adoption by the end of 2026; however, which specific waste categories it will cover, and whether copper scrap is included, have not yet been announced.
04 Disassembly
Retention Does Not Guarantee Consumption
The premise of export restrictions is that domestic capacity can absorb the scrap, which is precisely the most uncertain link. SMM’s viewpoint in the source material states clearly: if domestic sorting, pre-processing, smelting, and processing capacities cannot match the grade and volume of scrap, export restrictions could lead to inventory buildup and local price declines, ultimately undermining incentives for collection, sorting, and investment. European companies presented at the Malaga Conference provided real-world examples.
The raw materials manager at Spanish copper processor La Farga noted that the company produced 200,000 tons of copper in 2025, with 60% coming from recycled materials, and over 70% of its recycled materials in 2026 will come from within Europe. This indicates that clean red copper scrap is not difficult to sell in Europe. The problem lies with brass and complex scrap: newly added recycling capacity in Europe in recent years has focused mainly on copper rod, with limited capacity to process zinc-containing brass. ACIN specifically purchased equipment to separate zinc and copper to ensure its products could be sold in Europe. It is easy to retain copper scrap, but difficult to digest mixed brass scrap; this is the structural contradiction most likely to emerge after Europe restricts exports.
The situation in the United States presents another form of uncertainty. The July 30, 2025 Section 232 announcement on copper imposed a 50% tariff on semi-finished copper, but copper concentrate, cathode copper, and scrap copper itself are not within the scope of the tariff; meanwhile, the announcement invoked the Defense Production Act, requiring that 25% of high-quality scrap copper produced in the U.S. be sold domestically, and recommending licensing for exports of high-quality scrap copper. Over a year later, what constitutes “high quality,” how the ratio is calculated, when it will be implemented, and the scope of coverage for licenses remain undefined. In August this year, the U.S. authorized export restrictions on waste streams containing critical minerals, covering black powder, spent magnets, and some electronic waste, but copper scrap was explicitly excluded.
| U.S. Section 232 Related Measures | Content | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Tariffs on Semi-Finished Copper and Copper-Intensive Derivatives | 50% | Effective August 1, 2025 |
| Domestic Sales Requirement for High-Quality Scrap Copper | 25% | Details unclear |
| Export License for High-Quality Scrap Copper | Recommended Implementation | Details unclear |
| Domestic Sales Requirement for Copper Raw Materials | 25% in 2027, 30% in 2028, 40% in 2029 | Implemented annually |
| Tariff on Refined Copper (Proposed) | 15% in 2027, 30% in 2028 | Undecided |
The United States is the world’s largest exporter of scrap copper, but its impact on China has already been front-loaded. Affected by tariffs and quality standards, U.S. exports of scrap copper to China have continued to shrink; in September this year, Chinese imports of scrap copper from the U.S. accounted for only 0.81% of the month’s total import volume. Even if the 25% domestic sales requirement takes effect, it is not an export ban; the remaining 75% can still be exported; the true impact depends on which grades are covered, such as whether high-grade materials like bright copper will be included.
05 Comparison
China’s Scrap Copper Imports Are Shifting Sources
China is the world’s largest importer of scrap copper and the primary party bearing pressure from this round of policy adjustments. In 2025, China imported 2.3427 million tons of scrap copper (in kind), a year-on-year increase of 4.1%, with Japan replacing the U.S. as the largest source, exporting 361,300 tons to China throughout the year. In the first half of 2026, imports reached 1.2415 million tons, a year-on-year increase of 8.39%, with Thailand and Japan ranking first and second. Based on approximately 310,000 tons of EU exports to China in 2025, direct EU supply to China accounts for more than 10% of China’s total imports (estimated); while this proportion is not the largest, the impact will not be confined to just this small share.
| Indicator | Volume | YoY Change |
|---|---|---|
| China’s Scrap Copper Imports in 2025 | 2.3427 million tons | +4.1% |
| H1 2026 Imports | 1.2415 million tons | +8.39% |
| H1 Imports from Thailand | 200,500 tons | +55.33% |
| H1 Imports from Japan | 198,000 tons | +38% |
| September 2026 Imports | 236,600 tons | +28.54% |
| September Imports from Japan | 27,400 tons | -18.05% |
| September Imports from Spain | 13,700 tons | +110.74% |
Note: Import volumes are reported in physical terms under customs code 74040000.
September data already reveals shifts. Imports reached 236,600 tons in the month, a 33.37% increase month-on-month, with cumulative imports for January–September up 10.35% year-on-year. Thailand led with 42,300 tons, accounting for 17.88%; Japan accounted for only 27,400 tons, down 18.05% year-on-year. SMM attributes this decline to rising domestic demand for scrap copper among Japanese smelters, which will gradually reduce exportable volumes. Europe has emerged as the fastest-growing source: Spain saw a 110.74% year-on-year increase, the Netherlands rose by 108.83%, Italy by 70.49%, Portugal by 124.10%, and Poland by 215.77%. European traders are rushing to ship goods before the May 2027 deadline.
More noteworthy is the routing through third countries. Thailand and Malaysia were not granted authorization for metal scrap exports by the EU in the draft list; if the final list remains unchanged, European scrap routed through Southeast Asia for processing before entering China will also face restrictions. Consequently, European scrap copper is more likely to flow toward OECD countries such as Turkey, Japan, and South Korea, as well as a few approved non-OECD nations. On the domestic demand side, requirements are becoming stricter: starting in 2026, the comprehensive implementation of "reverse invoicing" for renewable resources mandates that tax supervision ensure consistency across capital flows, invoice flows, and cargo flows. This has significantly increased demand for tax-inclusive scrap copper and imported scrap copper. This implies that China’s reliance on compliant imported materials is rising, while the sources of such compliant imports are narrowing.
06 Assessment
Scrap copper will not become scarcer, but it will become more expensive.
Mingli Fang’s assessment is that export restrictions will not reduce the global total volume of scrap copper but will split the market into two tiers: “compliant and traceable” versus “other.” The premium for the former will continue to rise, leading to price differentials for scrap copper of the same grade depending on origin and route; the latter may accumulate and drop in price within exporting countries, with European yellow brass scrap being the most typical example.
| Indicator | Value |
|---|---|
| LME Copper Spot Settlement Price (October 30) | $14,449/ton |
| SHFE Copper Main Continuous Contract (October 30) | ¥107,250/ton |
| Shanghai 1# Electrolytic Copper (October 30) | ¥110,370/ton |
| Primary-Scrap Spread (October 20) | ¥2,581/ton |
| Primary-Scrap Spread (Mid-July) | Over ¥3,000/ton |
| Utilization Rate of Scrap Copper for Anode Copper Production (September) | 42.46% |
| China’s Refined Copper Output in October (SMM) | 1.0867 million tons, -0.45% YoY |
First, prior to May 2027, the rush to ship European scrap to China will continue, but total volumes are constrained by Europe’s own inventory levels. SMM assesses that since 2025, copper prices have repeatedly hit record highs, and scrap copper inventories outside China have been largely depleted. Global social inventories have continued to decline, making it difficult for China’s scrap copper imports in October to maintain the high levels seen in September. Rush shipments can only bring forward volumes that would otherwise occur after 2027; they cannot increase total supply.
Second, post-2027, China faces a superposition of several policies. Direct supplies from the EU, which account for just over 10% of the share, face interruption; transit via Southeast Asia is restricted; Japanese smelters are retaining more scrap domestically; South Korea has begun implementing export declarations; and once implemented, U.S. domestic sales requirements could lock up some high-grade material. Individually, none of these measures are fatal, but combined, compliant imported scrap copper will shift from being “available at market price” to “first check qualifications, then negotiate price.”
Third, the impact on copper prices is primarily reflected in the raw material structure. As scrap copper tightens, the primary-scrap spread becomes harder to widen, compressing the cost advantage of recycled copper rods relative to refined copper rods. Some downstream users may switch to purchasing refined copper, providing support for refined copper consumption. Currently, copper concentrate treatment charges are in deep negative territory, and scrap copper is also tightening. With both raw materials constrained simultaneously, growth in refined copper production is slowing: SMM data shows that China’s refined copper output fell 2.09% year-on-year in August and 0.45% in October. This pattern of “tight mines and tight scrap” serves as one of the underlying supports for high copper price levels.
07 Outlook
Three Key Nodes Determine Flows
Tracking Point 1: The EU’s First Authorized List on November 21. Focus on whether India, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam can gain approval for metal scrap through supplementary materials, and whether China submits an application. If Southeast Asian countries remain unapproved, European material transiting through Southeast Asia will shrink significantly after May 2027. Importers with long-term European contracts should verify delivery arrangements and alternative routes for post-May 2027 periods as soon as possible.
Tracking Point 2: The EU Authorization Regulation Before Year-End. Key issues include whether copper scrap is included in the scope of “comprehensive ban on exports to non-OECD countries” and which candidate countries are covered by exceptions. If copper scrap is included, discounts on European yellow brass scrap will widen considerably, increasing the re-export value to OECD channels such as Turkey, Japan, and South Korea. Companies shifting to these channels must prepare in advance for independent audits of receiving facilities required by the EU.
Tracking Point 3: The Definition of “High-Quality Scrap Copper” in the U.S. and China’s Monthly Import Structure. Once the U.S. clarifies that its 25% domestic sales requirement covers high-grade materials such as bright copper, global supplies of high-grade scrap copper will tighten further. Simultaneously, monitor the monthly import growth rates from European countries like Spain and the Netherlands, and whether the primary-scrap spread returns above ¥3,000/ton. For recycled copper enterprises, compliant invoices and traceability systems are becoming core competitive advantages in procurement, rather than mere cost items.
Retaining scrap copper is easy; utilizing it effectively is difficult.
— END —