While the apparent "Super El Niño" has tightened global copper supply across the board, the deficit is concentrated at the mine and treatment charge levels; refined copper is still projected to be in surplus.

Core Summary ● Since July, repeated storms, blizzards, and avalanches have struck Chilean mines, causing temporary shutdowns at Caserones, Los Pelambres, and El Teniente, while some ports and highways were temporarily closed. ● The US Climate Prediction Center issued an 83% probability on October 8 that this El Niño event will reach its peak intensity since 1950 between October and December, and persist into the first quarter of 2027. ● The Chilean Copper Commission (Cochilco) predicted a 2026 production of 5.27 million tonnes, a decrease of 2.6%; however, this was an August forecast. Back-calculating from January–August data, achieving this target would require year-on-year growth of approximately 7% for September–December (estimated). ● Mine-side supply is indeed tightening: spot copper concentrate treatment charges have fallen to negative $272 per tonne; yet the International Copper Study Group (ICSG) still projects refined copper surpluses of 104,000 tonnes in 2026 and 368,000 tonnes in 2027. ● Mineral Cube Assessment: Full-year Chilean production is more likely to fall between 5.00 million and 5.14 million tonnes. Mine-side tightness will continue to pressure smelters, providing support to copper prices, but it is unlikely to drive a new upward trend on its own.

01 Trigger

Storms Blowing from July to October

On October 22, Bloomberg reported that a rare "Super El Niño" is intensifying storms in central Chile. Since July, multiple storms have hit mining areas, forcing temporary production halts at certain mines and restricting road and port access, thereby dragging down national copper output. Chilean authorities urged mines on Monday to prepare for prevention measures, citing rising temperatures as a risk factor for ice and snow masses. The Chilean Meteorological Agency predicted that storm activity would recur later this Thursday.

Viewing these months' events in sequence, weather impacts are not isolated incidents but rather one wave after another. The real issue lies in the fact that before mines can recover from the previous storm, the next one arrives.

TimeEventImpact
Mid-to-late JulySevere winter storms hit central-northern regions, killing at least 13 peopleCaserones halted production; Los Pelambres stopped operations for several days; El Teniente and others suspended work
July 17Road interruptionsTeck's Carmen de Andacollo concentrator partially halted production
From August 13Second round of stormsTransmission towers at Caserones damaged again; Lundin revised guidance downward
Mid-AugustAntofagasta and Lundin revised full-year guidanceCombined reduction of 35,000–55,000 tonnes
SeptemberStorms combined with poor sea conditionsHuasco and Coquimbo ports temporarily closed, reportedly
October 11Avalanche in El Teniente open pit, 2 fatalitiesOpen pit production halted; accounts for less than 10% of the mine's output
October 19Authorities urge mines to take precautionsNew round of storms approaching

A Bloomberg report on October 19 stated that at least seven workers died at Chilean mines over the past month, two of whom perished in the El Teniente avalanche. The combination of weather, accidents, and labor disputes continues to put pressure on supply in the world's largest copper-producing country.

02 Background

How Strong Is This El Niño?

Diagnosis by the US Climate Prediction Center on October 8 showed that sea surface temperature anomalies in the Niño-3.4 region reached 2.1°C, while the Niño-1+2 region reached 3.9°C. The Center gave an 83% probability that this El Niño will reach "historical intensity" between October and December, exceeding all El Niño events since 1950; strong to extremely strong El Niño conditions will persist until January–March 2027, with probabilities remaining above 83%.

IndicatorValueDescription
Niño-3.4 Sea Surface Temperature Anomaly+2.1°CDiagnosis on October 8
Niño-3 Sea Surface Temperature Anomaly+3.0°C—
Niño-1+2 Sea Surface Temperature Anomaly+3.9°CNear South American coast
Probability of Reaching Historical Intensity (Oct–Dec)83%Exceeding all events since 1950
Probability of Reaching Historical Intensity (Nov–Jan)70%—
Duration of Strong to Extremely Strong ConditionsUntil Jan–Mar 2027Probability remains above 83%

The mechanism by which El Niño affects Chile is not complex. Arnoldo Suniga, a meteorologist at the Chilean Meteorological Agency, explained that El Niño weakens the high-pressure system that usually keeps storms away from central Chile. Historically, strong El Niños in the early 1980s and late 1990s brought severe storms and floods to Chile; in 1997, Santiago received more than twice its usual rainfall.

It is not just mines that are affected. Winter floods and spring hail delayed the planting of crops such as corn, interrupted vegetable harvesting, and damaged some fruits; Bloomberg noted this could push up farmers' costs and food prices. For copper, what is more alarming is timing: the peak of El Niño falls between October and December, which is precisely the final quarter when Chilean mining companies sprint to achieve their annual production targets.

03 Breakdown

The 5.27 Million Tonnes Figure Is Already Optimistic

The forecast cited in the material was released by the Chilean Copper Commission (Cochilco) in August: Chilean mine copper production in 2026 is expected to be approximately 5.27 million tonnes, a year-on-year decline of 2.6%, about 30,000 tonnes lower than the May forecast; production is expected to rebound to approximately 5.55 million tonnes in 2027. At the time of this forecast release, the impact of the July storms had only just begun to manifest.

Subsequent monthly data published has been worse. Data from the National Statistics Institute (INE) of Chile showed that copper production in July was 403,400 tonnes, a year-on-year decline of 9.4%; the INE attributed this to unfavorable weather in the north and maintenance at large mines. Production in August was 369,500 tonnes, a year-on-year decline of 12.8%; the INE stated that the impact of the July storms continued to drag down extraction and processing. According to Cochilco's methodology, August production was 366,300 tonnes, a year-on-year decline of 12.7%; cumulative production from January to August was 3.248 million tonnes, a year-on-year decline of 7.7%.

TimeProductionYoY ChangeMethodology
H1 20262.481 million tonnes-6.6%Official Chilean Data
July 2026403,400 tonnes-9.4%Chilean National Statistics Institute (INE)
August 2026369,500 tonnes-12.8%Chilean National Statistics Institute (INE)
August 2026366,300 tonnes-12.7%Chilean Copper Commission (Cochilco)
Jan–Aug 20263.248 million tonnes-7.7%Chilean Copper Commission (Cochilco)

This allows for backward deduction. Based on a 5.27 million tonne figure representing a 2.6% decline, the 2025 production is estimated at approximately 5.41 million tonnes; based on a 7.7% decline from January to August, the same period in 2025 is estimated at approximately 3.519 million tonnes, meaning September to December 2025 would account for approximately 1.892 million tonnes (all figures are estimates).

ScenarioSep–Dec ProductionYoY ChangeFull-Year ProductionFull-Year YoY Change
Realize Committee ForecastApprox. 2.022 million tonnes+6.9%5.27 million tonnes-2.6%
Sep–Dec Flat vs. Last YearApprox. 1.892 million tonnes0%Approx. 5.14 million tonnes-5.0%
Continue Jan–Aug Decline RateApprox. 1.746 million tonnes-7.7%Approx. 4.99 million tonnes-7.7%

The figures in the table are calculated by Kuanglifang. To realize the Committee’s forecast, monthly average production from September to December needs to be approximately 506,000 tonnes, whereas August saw only 366,300 tonnes. Achieving such a rebound during the peak of El Niño is difficult. In contrast, Chilean Finance Minister Jorge Bulnes’ assessment of a “decline of approximately 7%, down to approximately 5 million tonnes” aligns closely with the scenario continuing current declines; CRU’s estimate of a decline approaching 5% corresponds to the second scenario.

04 Breakdown

Weather Is Only an Amplifier

Blaming the entire production decline on weather is inaccurate. What weather has amplified are the structural problems already existing in Chile’s copper mining sector.

Mine or CompanyLatest SituationMain Reasons
Escondida (BHP)Q3: 252,600 tonnes, down 23% YoYGrade decline, maintenance, severe weather, temporary shutdown after fatal accident in September
BHP Copper Business TotalQ3: 400,700 tonnes, down 19% YoYDisturbances in Chile, full-year guidance maintained
CollahuasiAugust: down 25% YoY—
CodelcoJan–Aug own mines: 761,400 tonnes, down 8.1% YoYWithdrew full-year target of 1.34 million tonnes in August
El TenienteJan–Aug: 170,600 tonnes, down 20.3% YoYJuly 2025 rockburst accident, October 2026 avalanche
Caserones (Lundin)Guidance lowered from 130,000–140,000 tonnes to 120,000–130,000 tonnesTransmission towers damaged by two storms
AntofagastaGuidance lowered from 650,000–700,000 tonnes to 625,000–655,000 tonnesLos Pelambres affected by storms

First is grade decline and aging. Jefferies estimates that Chilean open-pit mines lose approximately 2% of annual output due to natural depletion; as pits deepen and grades fall, more ore must be processed to produce the same amount of copper. CRU projects that Chile will not return to 6 million tonnes until 2030. Second are safety accidents. Escondida experienced a temporary shutdown in September following a fatal accident, and El Teniente suffered an avalanche in October this year, following a rockburst accident in July 2025. Third is labor-management relations. The Centinela strike lasted over a week before ending, and strikes by managers and employees at Escondida were narrowly avoided at the last minute; Kuanglifang provided dedicated analysis on these events on October 11 and 19.

Codelco’s issues run deeper. Bloomberg reported that Codelco is investigating potential irregularities in its 2024 and 2025 production data and seeking to recover bonuses paid based on inflated figures; the new chairman, Bernardo Fontaine, prioritizes profitability over production volume. This means that even if weather conditions improve, Codelco may not necessarily ramp up production to full capacity.

05 Comparison

Mine Supply Tightening, But Refined Copper Is Not Short

By normal logic, continuous production cuts by the world’s largest copper producer should drive copper prices sharply higher. However, on October 22, LME three-month copper contracts closed at $14,089 per tonne, dipping intraday to their lowest level since September 15; LME copper inventory increased for the fourth consecutive day, rising to 272,950 tonnes, the highest level since late July. Chile’s production cuts have not created tightness in the refined copper market because mine supply and ingot supply are moving in opposite directions.

IndicatorLatest DataIssue Reflected
SMM Imported Copper Concentrate Spot Treatment ChargeSept 18–22: -$221.89/dmt, historical lowTight mine supply
Fastmarkets Asia-Pacific Copper Concentrate TC/RCOct 9: -$272.20/dmtSmelters competing for raw materials
2026 Copper Concentrate Long-Term Benchmark TC/RC$0Compressed smelter margins
ICSG 2026 Refined Copper BalanceSurplus of approx. 104,000 tonnesLoose ingot supply
ICSG 2027 Refined Copper BalanceSurplus of approx. 368,000 tonnesNew smelting capacity coming online
LME Copper Inventory272,950 tonnes (Oct 22)Increasing consecutively
LME Three-Month Contract$14,089 (Oct 22)Five-week low

The International Copper Study Group (ICSG), on October 14, predicted that global copper mine production would grow by 1.3% in 2026, refined copper production by 0.4%, and consumption by 1.5%; in 2027, copper mine production would grow by 3.1% and refined copper production by 3.4%, primarily driven by ramp-ups at new smelters in Indonesia, India, and the EU. Refined copper supply does not rely entirely on copper concentrate; hydrometallurgical copper and recycled copper can fill the gap. This is the source of “tight mine supply, loose ingot supply”: the pace of smelting capacity expansion outstrips that of mines, with the deficit reflected in treatment charges rather than in ingot availability.

There are also variables in this surplus forecast. According to compilation by 21st Century Business Herald, the ICSG’s April forecast for the 2027 surplus was approximately 377,000 tonnes, slightly adjusted to 368,000 tonnes in October, indicating that Chile’s production cuts have not significantly altered its judgment regarding the refined end. However, 368,000 tonnes represents only about 1.3% of annual consumption; slight deviations in mine restarts, smelter utilization rates, or consumption growth could significantly narrow the surplus. Additionally, Reuters reported that COMEX certified warehouse copper inventory exceeds 714,000 tonnes; while this inventory does not increase global production, its flow direction directly impacts the tightness or looseness of the LME.

The increase in inventory also has trading-level reasons. At the beginning of the year, large volumes of copper were shipped to COMEX to hedge against potential U.S. tariffs on copper; now, COMEX front-month prices are lower than LME prices, causing metal to flow back into LME warehouses. Nevertheless, LME copper spot remains at a premium of $116 per tonne to the three-month contract, indicating that near-term supply remains relatively tight. Kuanglifang’s articles on October 9 regarding the CSIS copper smelting report and on October 13 regarding sulfuric acid both discussed the dual squeeze on smelters caused by negative treatment charges and declining byproduct revenues.

06 Assessment

The Costs at the Mine End Will Be Passed to Smelters

MinuliCube’s assessment is that Chile’s copper production in 2026 is more likely to fall within the range of 5.00 million to 5.14 million metric tons (estimated), below the 5.27 million metric tons forecast by the Chilean Copper Commission (Cochilco). The peak of El Niño overlaps with the final quarter of the year, and declining ore grades, safety incidents, and labor-management issues are unlikely to dissipate in the short term; therefore, a year-on-year rebound of approximately 7% between September and December is difficult to achieve. Based on this projection, Chile may produce an additional 130,000 to 280,000 metric tons less than the Commission’s forecast (estimated), and the global expectation for mine production growth of 1.3% this year may also be revised downward.

However, this shortfall will primarily impact smelters rather than refined copper prices. There are three reasons for this: First, treatment charges (TCs) have already turned negative; the tightness at the mining end is mainly transmitted through smelter margins, with some Chinese smelters planning maintenance in October and November and signaling intentions to reduce output. Second, refined copper supply can be supplemented by hydrometallurgical copper and recycled copper, meaning the surplus anticipated by the International Copper Study Group (ICSG) has not disappeared despite Chile’s production cuts. Third, fluctuations in macroeconomic sentiment and AI-related enthusiasm are currently suppressing industrial metals, including copper.

ScenarioTrigger ConditionsImpact on Copper ConcentratesImpact on Copper Prices
Base CaseChilean production approx. 5.00–5.14 million mt; increased smelter maintenanceTCs remain deeply negativeHigh-level volatility, supported by mine-side constraints
TighterPeru rainy season coincides with new storms in Chile; widespread smelter output cutsTCs continue to hit new lowsRefined side turns tight, creating upside potential
LooserWeather improves; Escondida ore grades recover; new smelting capacity ramps upTCs see slight recoverySuppressed by expectations of surplus

For China’s copper industry chain, the smelting segment is most directly affected. With negative treatment charges and falling sulfuric acid prices, the space for smelters to offset losses via by-products is narrowing. MinuliCube believes that long-term contract negotiations for copper concentrates in 2027 will face continued pressure on top of “zero treatment charges,” and smelter output cuts may become the primary mechanism for balancing the market. If smelter cutbacks are large enough, the dynamic could shift from “tight mines, loose ingots” to “tight mines and tight ingots,” at which point copper prices would truly reflect Chile’s production reductions.

07 Outlook

Three key items to monitor next

Tracking Point 1: Chile’s September production data. The National Statistics Institute (INE) and the Chilean Copper Commission (Cochilco) will release September data in late October to early November. If September’s decline remains in double digits, the likelihood of Chile’s annual production falling below 5.10 million metric tons will rise significantly, and the Commission’s forecast may be downgraded in its next update.

Tracking Point 2: Copper concentrate treatment charges and Chinese smelter output cuts. Treatment charges are a direct indicator of mine-side tightness. If TCs continue to set new lows and are accompanied by actual output reductions by Chinese smelters, the expectation of refined copper surplus will be corrected; this is the key factor determining whether copper prices can regain strength.

Tracking Point 3: El Niño peak and Peru’s rainy season. The U.S. Climate Prediction Center forecasts that El Niño will peak between October and December and persist into the first quarter of 2027. Peru declared a 60-day state of emergency covering 796 districts in July. If Peru’s rainy season coincides with a strong El Niño early next year, South America’s two major copper-producing nations may be disrupted simultaneously.

The super El Niño brings a supply test lasting several months to the copper market. It makes mining harder and smelting harder, but for the copper ingot market to feel equivalent pressure, the smelting sector must yield first.

The storm tightens the mines; copper ingots await concessions from smelters.

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