India Turns Back to Zambia for Copper
The negotiations collapsed just this past April—and the closure of a single plant in 2018 was what undermined India’s self-sufficiency in copper.
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| Key Takeaways | On September 1, Reuters reported that India has restarted investment talks with Zambia regarding critical minerals such as copper. Indian Ministry of Mines officials held preliminary consultations with their Zambian counterparts on August 26. One source revealed that neither side discussed the stranded project that had previously caused the negotiations to break down. This is not the first time both parties have sat at the negotiating table—Reuters reported in April this year that key mineral negotiations between India and Zambia stalled because Lusaka failed to provide guarantees regarding mining rights for an area of 9,000 square kilometers, which India had been approved to use the previous year for cobalt and copper exploration. India’s thirst for overseas copper mines traces its roots back to 2018—after the Sterlite copper smelter, part of the Vedanta Group, was permanently shut down by the Tamil Nadu government, India transformed from a net exporter of copper into a net importer. Official forecasts predict that by 2047, India’s dependence on copper concentrate imports could reach 91% to 97%. This eight-year anxiety over resources is now directing New Delhi’s gaze away from the completely closed domestic facility toward the distant Zambian copper belt. |
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◎ I. India and Zambia Restart Critical Mineral Negotiations
According to a Reuters report on September 1, two sources familiar with the matter revealed that India has restarted investment negotiations with Zambia in the fields of copper and other critical minerals, with officials from both sides holding preliminary consultations on August 26. One source specifically noted that this consultation did not involve the specific project that had previously caused the negotiations to stall—meaning both sides chose to bypass old points of divergence and attempt to restart cooperation in a more pragmatic manner. The Indian Ministry of Mines did not respond to Reuters’ request for comment, while a spokesperson for the Zambian Ministry of Mines stated that “no information can be confirmed at present.” This cautious stance from both official sides somewhat reflects how, after experiencing a breakdown in negotiations, both parties have become more restrained in their public statements.
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◎ II. These Negotiations Had Just Collapsed Half a Year Ago
Looking back at the timeline, Reuters reported on April 16 this year that key mineral negotiations between India and Zambia had stalled because Lusaka failed to provide guarantees regarding mining rights. This involved a 9,000-square-kilometer (approximately 3,475 square miles) area approved for India in 2025 for the exploration of cobalt (a key raw material for electric vehicle and mobile phone batteries) and copper. India had previously dispatched geological exploration teams to Zambia, which returned with mineral samples including cobalt and copper; this exploration plan was originally intended to last for three years, after which New Delhi planned to invite private enterprises to participate, provided that mining rights were secured first. According to sources familiar with the matter, the Indian government had internally discussed the increasingly tight fragility of its copper market last year and, in trade negotiations with resource-rich countries, simultaneously sought pathways to ensure supply. In reports from that time, one source indicated that New Delhi was working hard to push for the resumption of negotiations, but “the situation remained unclear”—as it turns out, this “uncertainty” lasted for more than four months before preliminary consultations were held on August 26.
| Time | Event |
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| 2025 | India approved a 9,000-square-kilometer area for exploring cobalt and copper resources in Zambia. |
| 2025 | Indian geological exploration teams traveled to Zambia, bringing back mineral samples. |
| April 16, 2026 | Reuters reported that negotiations stalled due to the lack of guarantees regarding mining rights. |
| August 26, 2026 | Indian Ministry of Mines officials held preliminary consultations with Zambian counterparts, restarting negotiations. |
| September 1, 2026 | Reuters reported that negotiations had resumed, without involving the previously stranded project. |
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◎ III. The Origin of the Matter: A Factory Closure Turned India from an Exporter to an Importer
India’s current urgency regarding overseas copper mines traces its roots back to a factory that operated for 22 years. The Thoothukudi (formerly Tuticorin) smelter of Sterlite Copper, part of the Vedanta Group, began operations in 1996 and was subsequently ordered to halt production multiple times due to pollution issues—in 2010, it was shut down by the Madras High Court (later allowed to resume operations by the Supreme Court), and in 2013, it was shut down again by the Tamil Nadu government following a gas leak. At that time, the Supreme Court fined the company 100 million rupees but allowed the factory to continue operating subject to meeting several conditions. On May 22, 2018, protests against the expansion of the plant escalated into violent clashes, resulting in 13 deaths when police opened fire; later that same month, the Tamil Nadu government permanently shut down the plant citing “repeated violations of pollution emission regulations.” On February 29, 2024, the Supreme Court of India dismissed Vedanta’s final appeal to reopen the plant, citing “serious environmental violations and repeated breaches,” upholding the permanent shutdown ruling by the Madras High Court. In June 2022, Vedanta had attempted to find a buyer for the plant, publicly soliciting purchase intentions, but ultimately failed to facilitate a transaction.
How significant is this plant? The Thoothukudi smelter has an annual capacity of 400,000 tonnes, accounting for approximately 36% to 40% of India’s total copper smelting capacity. Before its closure, India exported roughly half of its domestic copper production, ranking among the world’s top five exporters of copper cathodes. Following the shutdown, India reverted to being a net importer of copper for the first time in 18 years; copper exports plummeted from 378,000 tonnes in the previous fiscal year to just 48,000 tonnes in the 2018-19 fiscal year, a decline of approximately 90%. According to calculations by CUTS International, the closure of this plant resulted in economic losses of approximately INR 14.749 billion for India. At that time, two other major domestic copper smelters—Hindalco and the state-owned Hindustan Copper—held market shares of approximately 38% and 10%, respectively, but their combined capacity was far insufficient to fill the gap left by Thoothukudi. Vedanta Group subsequently stated publicly that the plant’s closure “made India dependent on China, an unfriendly neighbor, for copper imports,” and redirected the originally planned $2 billion investment intended for India toward Saudi Arabia to build a greenfield copper smelting and refining plant with an annual capacity of 400,000 tonnes, along with a copper rod project with an annual capacity of 300,000 tonnes. This investment is expected to contribute USD 19 billion to Saudi GDP. Beyond copper metal itself, the closure of the Thoothukudi plant also impacted the production of downstream by-products such as sulfuric acid, phosphoric acid, and gypsum, forcing related enterprises to import these chemical raw materials from countries including Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. The impact chain extended far deeper than a simple copper supply shortfall. Some figures in the Indian industry have pointed out that, given the sustained rise in copper prices in recent years, copper smelting itself is a business with considerable returns; theoretically, the return on investment (ROI) for restarting projects similar to Thoothukudi could reach around 400%. This is precisely why industry associations periodically call upon the Supreme Court to reconsider its ruling in the Sterlite case.
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◎ IV. How are 91% to 97% calculated?
The gap created by Sterlite’s closure, combined with India’s rapid economic growth, is pushing the country into an increasingly import-dependent position. In the fiscal year 2025 (ending March 2025), India’s copper imports reached 1.2 million tonnes, a 4% year-on-year increase, making India currently the world’s second-largest buyer of refined copper. From the consumption side, India’s current per capita copper consumption is approximately 1 kg, projected to rise to 3.2 kg per person by 2047. Industry estimates indicate that after 2029, India will need to add at least 400,000 tonnes of smelting capacity every five years merely to keep pace with demand growth. Against this backdrop of supply-demand gaps, the Indian government predicts that India’s dependence on copper concentrate imports could reach 91% to 97% by 2047. This figure is both an extrapolation of current trends and a direct driver behind New Delhi’s frequent global search for copper resources in recent years. Copper is known as the “barometer” of India’s economic growth, widely used in construction, infrastructure, power, transportation, consumer electronics, and automotive manufacturing. As renewable energy and electric vehicle industries expand, copper’s strategic importance continues to climb. The tug-of-war between rising demand and supply shortages leaves little room for reversal in this arithmetic equation of import dependence.
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◎ V. India’s Response: KABIL and Its Global Footprint
Faced with growing resource gaps, India primarily secures key mineral supplies overseas through Kanungo Bidesh Mining Limited (KABIL)—the core platform for ensuring overseas critical mineral supplies. According to Reuters, KABIL is currently evaluating investment opportunities in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Russia, and Indonesia, while also negotiating over a project in Malawi. In addition to bilateral consultations with Zambia, India is engaging in government-to-government talks with multiple African nations to secure critical mineral blocks, while simultaneously exploring cooperation opportunities in Australia and Latin America. This strategy of “multi-point layout and diversified betting” is itself a response to the lessons learned from Sterlite: putting eggs in multiple baskets to avoid repeating the scenario where the closure of a single smelter disrupts national supply. KABIL was jointly funded by three state-owned enterprises: National Aluminium Company (NALCO), Mineral Exploration Corporation Limited (MECL), and Rare Earths Corporation Limited (RECL). It is specifically tasked with acquiring strategic mineral assets such as lithium and cobalt overseas and serves as one of the executing entities under India’s “National Critical Minerals Mission.” The negotiations with Zambia constitute a piece of this broader strategic puzzle. The National Critical Minerals Mission, under the Ministry of Mines, has previously explicitly included copper, lithium, graphite, nickel, and other minerals on its priority list. The goal is to drive progress through a dual approach: “going out” to acquire resources and “bringing in” to develop domestic processing capabilities, thereby gradually reducing dependence on single import channels.
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◎ VI. Why Zambia and the DRC?
A spokesperson for the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry (FICCI) told Reuters that Africa, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia, can play a crucial role in meeting India’s growing demand for copper and cobalt. The federation recommended prioritizing efforts by Indian companies to secure existing projects and those nearing production completion, coupled with long-term off-take agreements, rather than embarking on greenfield exploration from scratch. This strategy of “buying ready-made solutions instead of reinventing the wheel” partly reflects lessons learned from previous setbacks in Zambia, where projects stalled due to lengthy exploration cycles and delayed mining rights. The DRC and Zambia hold pivotal positions in the global copper-cobalt resource landscape; the DRC is the world’s largest cobalt producer, while Zambia is Africa’s second-largest copper producer. This is why the FICCI groups these two countries together as key leverage points to address India’s copper and cobalt supply gaps.
| Zambia’s weight in the global copper mining map is no small matter; it is Africa’s second-largest copper producer and an object of competition among various national resource strategies. Just as India resumed negotiations, Manara Minerals, under the Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund, was also discussing copper mining investment opportunities with Zambia and was nearing the completion of an acquisition of a minority stake in First Quantum Minerals’ Zambian copper-nickel assets. The Zambian Minister of Mines had previously stated publicly that the government is promoting shareholding negotiations, striving to secure up to a 30% equity stake in new mining projects. While this has not significantly dampened investor enthusiasm, it has made foreign investors generally feel more complex when negotiating terms with Zambia. For India to truly secure long-term, stable supplies in this resource competition, the challenges it faces extend far beyond policy uncertainties within Zambia itself. |
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| Outlook |
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◎ VII. Looking Ahead: Will History Repeat Itself?
The next most critical signals to watch are: first, whether this negotiation strategy of “bypassing legacy projects” can truly clear the obstacles caused by the prior lack of mining rights guarantees for a new round of cooperation; second, whether India can implement its approach of “near-term production projects + long-term off-take agreements” rather than repeating the protracted process seen previously (“three years of exploration, followed by private sector entry”); and third, in the context that capital such as Saudi Arabia’s Manara also views Zambian copper resources favorably, whether India can secure attractive terms in international bidding. For China’s domestic copper industry chain, the future trajectory of supply structure from India—the world’s second-largest refined copper buyer—serves as an important reference point for assessing the global landscape of competition for copper mineral resources. As more resource-consuming major powers turn their attention to the same batch of African copper-producing countries, scarcity on the supply side will only be further amplified. It is worth noting that India had previously dispatched delegations to Chile to seek cooperation opportunities for lithium and copper assets; negotiations with Zambia constitute just one piece of the puzzle in its global resource map. However, given the slim prospects for restarting Sterlite domestically and the difficulty of bringing new smelting capacity online in the short term, the pace of acquiring overseas copper mine resources is likely to remain one of the core indicators for measuring India’s supply chain security in the coming years. This chain reaction, which began with the closure of a single plant, has now evolved into a long-term narrative of a major power seeking footholds for copper mines globally. Zambia is merely the latest stop in this narrative, and perhaps not the last.
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“It is easy to shut down a factory, but it takes more than eight years for a country to relearn how to refine its own copper.”
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