Indonesia Revises Nickel Ore Prices: The World’s Largest Nickel Supplier Begins Redistributing Profits Across the Industrial Chain

On September 15, a new regulation slashed the benchmark price for low-grade nickel ore by 45%—just four months after taxes were increased on high-grade ores, this move now yields concessions to hydrometallurgical smelters.

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Core Summary · On September 15, Indonesia’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) issued Decree No. 363, revising the formula for the Nickel Ore Benchmark Price (HPM). The benchmark price for low-grade laterite nickel ore (1.2% Ni) was reduced from $44.97/wmt to $24.89/wmt, a decrease of 45%. · This is a second revision to the HPM formula that took effect on April 15; the April version had raised the correction coefficient for high-grade ore (1.6% Ni) from 17% to 30% and introduced pricing for by-products such as cobalt and iron, causing benchmark prices for certain grades to surge by over 100%. · Indonesia controls more than 60% of global nickel ore supply, and its HPM pricing mechanism has replaced traditional supply-and-demand markets, becoming the de facto "floor" of the global nickel cost curve. · MineCube Assessment: This is not Indonesia "yielding profits," but rather redistributing mining profits between two types of downstream smelters (pyrometallurgical NPI plants vs. hydrometallurgical HPAL plants)—some of the taxes added in April are being returned to the other end this time. · A background often overlooked: The battlefield of this price game has shifted from "whether exports are allowed" to "which domestic link gets a larger share of profits," representing a continuation of Indonesia’s resource nationalism strategy.

Catalyst I: September 15 – Low-Grade Nickel Ore Benchmark Price Slashed Overnight by 45%

On September 15, Indonesia’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) issued Decree No. 363.K/MB.01/MEM.B/2026, further revising the Nickel Ore Benchmark Price (HPM) formula that had just taken effect on April 15 of this year. The revision primarily lowered the nickel correction factor (CF) and cobalt coefficients for low-grade laterite nickel ore. The HPM benchmark price for 1.2% Ni ore dropped from $44.97/wmt to $24.89/wmt, a decrease of 45%. The new benchmark price is already below the current market actual CIF price of $27/wmt. Such a magnitude of adjustment is rare in the history of Indonesian nickel ore pricing.

The chain reaction of price adjustments followed immediately: Calculated at a royalty rate of 14%, the royalty tax corresponding to the new benchmark price is approximately $3.48/wmt, significantly lower than the previous $3.78/wmt calculated based on actual transaction prices. The Indonesian Nickel Smelting Enterprises Association subsequently expressed public support for the new formula, stating it provides "operational certainty" for the industry. This positive response at the official association level further indicates that this adjustment precisely addressed the prior demands of downstream enterprises, rather than being merely a one-sided desire of the regulatory body.

Reports from Reuters also confirmed the specific mechanism of this adjustment: The Indonesian Ministry of Energy lowered the "correction coefficient" for low-grade ore with 1.2% nickel content from 26% to 14%, while reducing the coefficient for associated minerals such as cobalt from 30% to 17%. The new formula takes effect on September 15, simultaneously lowering the price, taxes, and royalties for low-grade nickel ore—commonly known as "limonite." This precise adjustment targeting a single grade interval indicates that the target of the Indonesian regulators this time was very clear: they did not intend to comprehensively reduce nickel ore prices, but specifically aimed to solve the problem of excessively high raw material costs for HPALs, preventing these enterprises from losing their competitive advantage internationally due to high raw material costs.

Background II: The "Structural Reset" in April Was Actually a Price Increase for Miners First

To understand the weight of the reduction in September, one must return to the reform itself in April. On April 15, 2026, Indonesia officially implemented a new HPM pricing formula (Decree No. 144), which represents the most substantive revision to Indonesia’s nickel ore benchmark pricing mechanism since its establishment. The previous formula was linked only to nickel grade; the new formula introduced joint pricing for by-products such as iron, cobalt, and chromium, and significantly raised the correction coefficient for 1.6% Ni ore from 17% to 30%. Institutional calculations show that under the new regulations, Indonesia’s nickel ore HPM prices increased by more than 100% compared to before, constituting a tangible "price hike" that directly raised the raw material cost baseline for all domestic smelting enterprises relying on purchased ores. The industry reaction at the time was quite strong.

The beneficiaries and losers of this price increase were also clear: Upstream mining enterprises holding mining licenses (IUP/IUPK) were the direct beneficiaries, with significantly enhanced bargaining power. Downstream smelters requiring purchased ores—particularly HPAL hydrometallurgical projects relying on low-grade laterite nickel ore as raw material—bore the pressure of rising costs. Some analyses suggested that this adjustment was actually ceding a larger profit space to upstream mining, which is why the September revision, which specifically lowered only the benchmark price for low-grade ore, was interpreted as a "correction" rather than a simple "price cut." There is an obvious causal relationship between the two revisions.

It is worth adding that the April reform also changed the pricing unit itself: The new formula unified the nickel ore pricing unit to USD/wmt (wet metric ton) and explicitly required simultaneous adjustment for moisture content. This means that the benchmark price calculated for the same batch of ore using the old and new formulas may produce additional differences due to changes in parameter calibers such as moisture and grade, further increasing the complexity of downstream enterprises calculating procurement costs. This is also why many international analytical institutions described it as a "structural reset" rather than a simple price adjustment—a term that remains in use today.

Breakdown III: Dissecting the Formula – Whose Costs Were Reduced, Whose Remained Unchanged

Comparing the two adjustments in April and September in a table makes it clearer what parameters this reform specifically altered, which enterprises were affected, and how refined the regulatory body’s adjustment techniques are:

TimeAdjustment ContentMain Affected Parties
April 15, 2026Correction coefficient for 1.6% Ni ore raised from 17% to 30%; joint pricing for cobalt, iron, and chromium introducedUpstream mining enterprises benefited; HPM for certain grades rose by over 100%
September 15, 2026Correction coefficient for 1.2% Ni ore lowered from 26% to 14%; cobalt coefficient lowered from 30% to 17%Low-grade laterite nickel ore price dropped by approx. 45%; HPAL hydrometallurgical smelters benefited
Latest H2 September Benchmark Price1.2% Ni ore: $27/wmt (flat); 1.4% Ni ore: $51.8/wmt (-0.6); 1.6% Ni ore: $63.4/wmt (-0.5)Prices for different grades fell slightly across the board; limited impact on pyrometallurgical NPI raw material costs

A key detail evident from this table is that the September adjustment precisely targeted the low-grade nickel interval of 1.2%, whereas the April increase focused on the higher-grade interval of 1.6%. The two revisions have hardly offset each other; instead, they act separately on two entirely different categories of downstream customers—high-grade ore primarily supplies pyrometallurgical smelting (producing Nickel Pig Iron, NPI), while low-grade ore primarily supplies hydrometallurgical smelting (producing Battery-Grade Intermediate Products, MHP). In effect, Indonesian regulators are using the same formula to adjust costs for two distinct technological routes. This "precision drip irrigation" style of adjustment warrants more attention than a blunt across-the-board price hike or cut.

From the perspective of corporate layout, this strategy of dividing and regulating is not accidental: Indonesia currently hosts two coexisting nickel smelting technological routes—the RKEF-NPI route represented by companies such as Tsingshan and Delong, which primarily serves the stainless steel industry; and the HPAL hydrometallurgical route represented by companies such as Limin and Huayou, which primarily serves the power battery supply chain. These two routes inherently require different ore grades. By choosing to use different parameters within the same formula to regulate them separately, the Indonesian regulatory authorities are, to some extent, balancing the interest demands of the country’s two major industrial clusters, avoiding collective losses for one category of enterprises caused by price adjustments in a single direction, thereby preventing broader industry backlash.

Lesson 4: Do Not Simply Interpret This Adjustment as "Indonesia Conceding Profits"

The most noteworthy point recorded during this verification is: On the surface, the new regulations issued on September 15 appear to be "reducing costs" for the industry. However, looking at only this adjustment makes it easy to overlook that the April price hike was the true starting point—viewing the two policies together reveals that Indonesia first significantly raised the cost benchmark for high-grade ore, then made partial concessions for low-grade ore. Over the full year, the overall tax burden and cost center for the mining sector likely remain higher than before the reform. This is why the September regulation cannot be simply interpreted as Indonesia "conceding profits" to downstream sectors.

A more accurate understanding is one of "redistribution": Through repeated adjustments to specific parameters within the HPM formula, the Indonesian government is effectively adjusting how much profit each segment of the domestic supply chain (mines, pyrometallurgical smelters, hydrometallurgical smelters) receives, rather than simply transferring profits to overseas buyers. Understanding this point is essential to comprehending why Indonesia’s nickel ore pricing policy has been repeatedly adjusted with seemingly shifting directions over the past six months, and prevents being misled by the apparent direction of any single price adjustment.

From a broader macroeconomic perspective, this policy discretion itself is a continuation of Indonesia’s "resource nationalism" strategy: Indonesia has previously attracted significant global nickel smelting capacity to its borders by imposing a comprehensive ban on nickel ore exports and mandating domestic processing. Now that nickel ore itself is no longer directly exported, the battlefield for price struggle has shifted from "whether it can be exported" to "which domestic segment gets a larger share of profits." The repeated adjustments to the HPM formula are the concrete manifestation of this struggle at the price mechanism level. This is also a key to understanding the context of Indonesia’s overall industrial policy in recent years and deserves continuous observation over a longer timeline.

Comparison 5: Indonesian Nickel vs. Traditionally Market-Priced Metals: Who Truly Determines Price?

Comparing Indonesia’s nickel ore pricing mechanism with traditionally market-priced metals makes it easier to understand the special nature of this "policy floor" and clarifies why international nickel prices are becoming increasingly difficult to predict using traditional supply-and-demand models:

DimensionIndonesian Nickel OreTraditionally Market-Priced Metals (Reference)
Price Formation MechanismGovernment HPM formula sets the minimum settlement price; enterprises cannot trade below this price.Prices are formed through exchange-based supply and demand bidding and fluctuate with market conditions.
Adjustment FrequencyHPM is published every half-month; the formula itself has been revised twice within the year.Prices change continuously, requiring no administrative adjustment.
Downstream Bargaining PowerDownstream smelters’ bargaining space is directly compressed or released by policy.Buyers and sellers negotiate autonomously based on market supply and demand.

This difference also explains why the international market’s reaction to Indonesia’s nickel ore pricing policy differs completely from its reaction to traditional metal price fluctuations: When LME nickel prices fluctuate, traders focus on inventory, demand, and macro liquidity; but when the Indonesian HPM formula undergoes adjustment, what the market truly needs to study are the changes in specific parameters within the legal text. This approach is closer to interpreting a tax law document than analyzing a supply-demand balance sheet. Consequently, tracking Indonesian nickel ore policy increasingly requires regulatory interpretation skills, not just traditional commodity analysis capabilities.

Assessment 6: Mineral Cube’s Judgment: Indonesia Uses Formulas, Not Markets, to Determine Nickel’s Cost Floor

Mineral Cube’s judgment is: As a country controlling more than 60% of global nickel ore supply, Indonesia has transformed the HPM formula into an industrial policy tool that can be adjusted at will, rather than merely a pricing reference reflecting supply and demand. This September downward adjustment is essentially a targeted regulation toward a specific category of downstream enterprises following the government’s substantial increase in the overall mining cost benchmark in April. The existence of this "policy floor" means that the bottom of international nickel prices is largely determined not by the global supply-and-demand curve, but by the parameter choices made during Indonesia’s next formula revision. This is also the specific footnote for Bernstein’s previous characterization of nickel as "the metal with the lowest degree of globalization/marketization."

For downstream enterprises, this also implies: Whether operating pyrometallurgical NPI plants or hydrometallurgical HPAL plants, both need to track "how the HPM formula will be adjusted next time" as a variable equally important to "where nickel prices will go," because raw material costs are no longer determined solely by the market but incorporate significant space for policy discretion. This is the most direct operational lesson left by this round of Indonesian nickel ore pricing reform for the entire supply chain—procurement and cost accounting teams must develop sensitivity to policy documents themselves, rather than merely staring at daily fluctuations in international nickel prices.

Outlook 7: 3 Tracking Signals

Rather than debating whether this downward adjustment is inherently positive or negative, it is more valuable to establish several specific nodes that can continuously verify the trajectory of Indonesia’s pricing policy, as the struggle surrounding the distribution of supply chain profits has clearly not yet truly ended:

  • Tracking Point 1: Monitor whether the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) subsequently issues similar downward revisions for the medium-to-high grade interval of 1.4%–1.6%. If the scope of adjustment expands to all ore grades, it indicates that the policy direction has shifted from "local correction" to "comprehensive loosening." This will be the core signal for judging whether Indonesia’s overall nickel ore pricing tone has turned.
  • Tracking Point 2: Monitor investment and commissioning data for the two types of smelting capacity in Indonesia—HPAL and NPI. The actual effect of this policy adjustment will ultimately depend on whether the relative expansion speed of these two types of capacity changes. This is also the key evidence for judging whether this profit redistribution has truly transmitted to physical capacity expansion.
  • Tracking Point 3: Pay attention to the subsequent rhythm of annual RKAB quota approvals. Adjustments to the price formula and the actual volume of ore supplied are equally important; together, they determine the real influence of Indonesian nickel ore on the global market. Looking at the price formula alone while ignoring quota approvals can lead to one-sided judgments. This is the final reminder most crucial to heed at the conclusion.

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The price of nickel ore has never been determined by a single decree from Indonesia; rather, it is set once in April and revised again in September, with adjustments made across different segments of its domestic supply chain. Each adjustment has clear beneficiaries and those bearing the pressure.

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