Peru Bets on Lithium and Uranium, With Glaciers as the First Test
A Mineral Alliance of Four South American Nations Masks a Conflict Between Resource Development and Glacier Protection
| Core Summary ● On August 28, the mining authorities of Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru signed a Joint Declaration on Strategic Minerals in Santiago. The declaration was signed by Guillermo Shinno, Peru’s Minister of Energy and Mines; it focuses on information sharing, regulatory coordination, and securing multilateral financing, without addressing specific projects. ● The significance of the declaration lies in its endorsement: President Dina Boluarte, who took office on July 28, explicitly stated that “Peru is a mining country.” Consequently, lithium and uranium projects in the Puno region, which had been stalled for years, have accelerated, bringing the Quelccaya Ice Cap to the center of public debate. ● American Lithium’s Falchani project plans to commence operations in 2028, with Phase I producing approximately 23,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) annually. The preliminary economic assessment conducted in early 2024 calculated a post-tax net present value (NPV) of $5.11 billion based on a price of $22,500 per tonne; at $12,000 per tonne, this drops to $1.5 billion. ● As of October 22, domestic battery-grade lithium carbonate traded at approximately RMB 98,800 per tonne, translating to an estimated pre-tax price of $12,700 per tonne, which is already close to the low-price scenario in the assessment. Uranium mining currently lacks dedicated legislation and technical regulations. ● Mineral Cube Assessment: The four-nation declaration will not alter the global lithium supply landscape in the short term. The true constraints on Falchani are lithium prices, financing, and the regulatory vacuum surrounding uranium. The glacier controversy determines how fast the project can proceed, not whether it can proceed at all. |
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01 The Trigger
A Declaration and a Glacier
On August 28, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru held their first ministerial meeting on strategic minerals in Santiago, the capital of Chile, signing the Joint Declaration on Regional Integration of Strategic Minerals. The signatories were the mining authorities of the four nations: Daniel Mas, Chile’s Minister of Economy and Mining; Luis Lucero, Argentina’s Secretary of Mining; Walter Landivar, Bolivia’s Undersecretary of Mining Policy, Regulation, and Oversight; and Guillermo Shinno, Peru’s Minister of Energy and Mines.
The content of the declaration centers on coordination: strengthening exchanges on geological information, mining policies, regulatory standards, and oversight mechanisms; promoting responsible investment and regional supply chain development; and jointly seeking technical and financial support from multilateral institutions for strategic mineral projects. The Chilean side described this as “the first step toward a permanent alliance.” This is a political intent document, not a binding treaty; the legal systems, approval procedures, and fiscal regimes of the four countries remain independent.
From a bilateral perspective, Chile and Argentina restarted their Treaty on Mining Integration and Complementarity this year and approved a protocol on the operation of border mining projects. Chile and Peru had previously signed a memorandum of understanding on mining affairs in 2025. The Chilean side also noted that its exports of mining equipment and services to the other three countries are six times the value of its mineral product exports. Speaking upon signing, Peruvian Minister Shinno stated that strategic minerals should be transformed into tools for creating higher added value and narrowing socioeconomic gaps.
The declaration regained attention more than two months later due to a long-form investigation published by international environmental media Mongabay in early November, which linked it to lithium and uranium projects in the Puno region of southern Peru. Dina Boluarte, a conservative political figure, won the second round of the presidential election on June 7 by a margin of less than 50,000 votes and took office on July 28. In an interview with Peruvian state media, she said, “We must understand that Peru is a mining country, so we must promote it.”
| Country | Signatory Representative | Position |
|---|---|---|
| Chile | Daniel Mas | Minister of Economy and Mining |
| Argentina | Luis Lucero | Secretary of Mining |
| Bolivia | Walter Landivar | Undersecretary of Mining Policy, Regulation, and Oversight |
| Peru | Guillermo Shinno | Minister of Energy and Mines |
02 Background
Peru’s Lithium and Uranium Endowment
Peru’s lithium and uranium are concentrated in the Macusani Plateau, located in the Carabaya Province of the Puno region. The Canadian company American Lithium controls at least 174 mining concessions covering an area of over 1,090 square kilometers through its Peruvian subsidiary, Macusani Yellowcake. These concessions encompass three projects: the Macusani Uranium Project, the Falchani Lithium Project, and the Quelccaya Lithium Exploration Project.
These mining rights were initially explored for uranium, with lithium only discovered in 2017. Since then, the projects have been mired in legal disputes: in 2018, Peru’s mining authority raised objections to certain concessions; in 2019, the government declared 32 of the 149 concessions invalid due to failure to pay fees on time; and in 2020, the company was penalized for unauthorized exploration activities. It was not until August 2025 that the Peruvian Supreme Court dismissed the lawsuits, confirming that these 32 concessions belonged to the company. One month later, the company increased the planned investment for the Falchani project by 22% to $847 million, with the additional funds primarily intended for building a refinery within the mining area.
Policy support has also continued to intensify. In 2021, Peru passed Law No. 31283, declaring the exploration, extraction, and industrialization of lithium as matters of public need and national interest. In early June 2026, the government issued Supreme Decree No. 006-2026-EM, announcing that hosting the first International Forum on “Uranium and Lithium” constitutes a matter of national interest. The explanatory memorandum of the decree identifies uranium and lithium as key strategic minerals of international importance. It should be noted that the executive clauses of this decree apply specifically to the forum itself and do not equate to mining permits, nor do they change current regulatory rules.
The first International Forum on “Uranium and Lithium” was held in Lima from July 7 to 8, with organizers claiming attendance by over 1,100 people. Then-Prime Minister Luis Arroyo stated during the event that it was time to discuss a “fourth nation” led by energy development driven by lithium and uranium.
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2017 | Discovery of lithium mineralization on the Macusani Plateau |
| 2018 | Mining authority raises objections to certain mining rights |
| 2019 | 32 out of 149 concessions declared invalid |
| 2021 | Law No. 31283 declares lithium a matter of national interest |
| August 2025 | Supreme Court confirms ownership of 32 concessions to the company |
| September 2025 | Planned investment for Falchani increased to $847 million |
| June 2026 | Supreme Decree identifies uranium and lithium as key strategic minerals |
| July 28, 2026 | Dina Boluarte takes office as President |
| August 28, 2026 | Four nations sign the Joint Declaration on Strategic Minerals |
| 2028 | Falchani plans to commence operations |
03 Breakdown
The Economic Ledger of Falchani
Falchani is a hard-rock lithium deposit suitable for open-pit mining. The project area comprises four concessions covering more than 2,800 hectares, located several kilometers east of the Quelccaya Ice Cap. According to the Preliminary Economic Assessment (PEA) updated in 2024, the project will be developed in three phases. Phase one will produce an average of 23,145 tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) annually; phase two will increase production to 45,084 tonnes annually; and phase three will reach 72,624 tonnes annually. Over the life of mine, cumulative output will total 2.64 million tonnes of LCE. Initial capital expenditure for phase one is estimated at $681 million, with total life-of-mine capital expenditure reaching $2.565 billion. Unit operating costs are approximately $5,092 per tonne.
The key assumption underlying the assessment is the price of lithium. At a price of $22,500 per tonne, the project’s pre-tax net present value (NPV) is $8.41 billion, and its after-tax NPV is $5.11 billion, yielding a pre-tax internal rate of return (IRR) of 40.7%. If the lithium price drops to $12,000 per tonne, the after-tax NPV falls to just $1.5 billion. A price decrease of approximately 47% results in a valuation contraction of roughly 71% (calculated). The company’s external communications claiming “value exceeding $6 billion over the operational period” are similarly predicated on high-price assumptions.
| Indicator | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual Production (Phase One) | 23,145 tonnes LCE |
| Annual Production (Phase Three) | 72,624 tonnes LCE |
| Total Life-of-Mine Production | 2.64 million tonnes LCE |
| Initial Investment (Phase One) | $681 million |
| Total Capital Expenditure (Life of Mine) | $2.565 billion |
| Unit Operating Cost | ~$5,092/tonne |
| After-Tax NPV ($22,500/tonne) | $5.11 billion |
| After-Tax NPV ($12,000/tonne) | $1.5 billion |
Note: The Preliminary Economic Assessment includes inferred resources, which do not constitute reserves. The assessment results carry significant uncertainty.
Turning to current market realities, according to Mysteel data, the mid-price for battery-grade lithium carbonate in China was CNY 98,800 per tonne on October 22. After deducting a 13% value-added tax (VAT), this equates to approximately CNY 87,400. Using an exchange rate of USD 1 = CNY 6.85, this translates to approximately $12,700 per tonne (calculated), which is more than 40% lower than the benchmark price used in the assessment and close to the low-price scenario of $12,000 per tonne. Domestic lithium prices have experienced significant volatility this year, rising above CNY 170,000 per tonne in late April, averaging around CNY 145,000 per tonne in mid-August, and falling below CNY 100,000 per tonne by late October.
04 Deconstruction: The Controversy Between Glaciers and Uranium
The Quelccaya Ice Cap sits at an altitude of approximately 5,600 meters and is the world’s second-largest tropical ice cap. Data from Peru’s National Institute of Glacier and Mountain Ecosystems (INANPE) indicates that the glacier holds approximately 2.43 billion cubic meters of water—enough to supply the city of Cusco for a century. However, ice volume has decreased by approximately 58% over the past 40 years. Meltwater from the glacier feeds into the Amazon basin and supplies the regions of Cusco and Puno. The area hosts 56 plant species and 76 bird species, including the glacial sparrow, one of only two known bird species that nests directly on ice.
| Indicator | Data |
|---|---|
| Altitude | ~5,600 meters |
| Global Ranking | Second-largest tropical ice cap |
| Water Storage | ~2.43 billion cubic meters |
| Ice Loss (Past 40 Years) | ~58% |
| Plant Species | 56 |
| Bird Species | 76 |
The controversy centers on two main issues. First is dust: Falchani employs open-pit blasting, leading activists to worry that metal-laden dust settling on the ice surface could reduce albedo and accelerate melting. Second is uranium: In 2023, the head of Macusani Yellowcake denied that Falchani contains uranium. However, a 2024 study by Pontifical Catholic University of Peru detected various trace minerals, including uranium, in the local lithium-rich rocks.
A deeper issue is regulatory ambiguity. Roger Merino, an environmental governance expert at Universidad de Pacífico, points out that Peru currently lacks approved specific legislation or technical regulations for uranium mining. Standards for uranium disposal remain vague, suggesting that accelerating development may imply lowering social and environmental thresholds. Critics describe the Macusani uranium project as "completely stalled," citing regulatory uncertainty as the primary cause. American Lithium states that it adheres to the highest environmental standards, noting that baseline studies found no endangered species or habitats within the project area.
05 Comparison: Peru in the Lithium Triangle
Among the four nations that signed the declaration, resource endowments and development models vary significantly. Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia form the so-called "Lithium Triangle," where resources are primarily brine-based. Peru, conversely, relies on hard-rock lithium, co-occurring with uranium in the same high-altitude plateau. Between 2022 and 2023, Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia discussed strengthening coordination within the lithium sector, with Brazil later included in public discussions regarding a potential "OPEC for Lithium." However, based on the public content of this declaration, the four nations have not addressed production or price coordination; the agreement appears closer to a platform for technical cooperation and investment promotion.
| Country | Lithium Resource Type | Development Model | Characteristics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chile | Brine Salars | State-led, joint ventures with private companies | Launched National Lithium Strategy in 2023 |
| Argentina | Brine Salars | Open to foreign investment | Resources owned by individual provinces |
| Bolivia | Brine Salars | State-owned enterprise-led | National Lithium Company (YLB) |
| Peru | Hard-rock Lithium & Co-genetic Uranium | Private sector development | Regulatory gap for uranium |
Local community attitudes are also divided. Puno is Peru’s third-poorest region, and residents of Carabaya Province anticipate that mining could bring up to 5,000 jobs. Merino conducted fieldwork in the Corani district, where Falchani is located, in 2024, finding that most communities support development. However, on the other side of the glacier in Finaya, community leader and ranger Yolanda Quispe explicitly opposes the project, arguing that lithium and uranium extraction would be "disastrous" for the glacier. Lonnie Thompson, a glaciologist who has been conducting research at Quelccaya since 1974, is advocating for the designation of the glacier as a national park.
06 Analysis: A Debate on Timing, Not Existence
MinLiFang’s assessment is that the four-nation declaration will not alter the global lithium supply landscape in the short term. The true constraints on Falchani are lithium prices, financing, and uranium regulation. The declaration itself contains no specific projects or funding commitments; it merely sets a direction for regional cooperation. Even if Falchani commences construction as scheduled in 2028, phase one production would not begin until after 2029, generating 23,000 tonnes of LCE annually—a limited impact on global supply balances.
Lithium prices represent the first major hurdle. While the project’s valuation under high-price assumptions is impressive, conversion using current domestic prices places it near the assessment’s low-price scenario. The total investment of $847 million includes a processing plant, posing significant financing challenges for a developer with no current production revenue. The company has previously engaged with investors in Peru and Germany. Whether lithium prices can recover above $20,000 per tonne will determine the project’s progress far more effectively than any government declaration.
Uranium is the second hurdle. The ore at Falchani contains trace amounts of uranium, meaning that even if lithium mining proceeds in isolation, it cannot bypass regulatory standards for radioactive waste disposal; meanwhile, the true development of the Macusani uranium project requires a comprehensive suite of regulations covering everything from extraction to transportation. Uranium prices themselves do not constitute an obstacle: according to Cameco data, the spot price for uranium stood at $86.36 per pound as of late July, remaining largely flat since February and sitting at relatively high levels in recent years. While the Peruvian government has incorporated both uranium and lithium into its narrative on strategic minerals, the corresponding regulatory framework has yet to catch up. Issues related to glaciers and communities determine the difficulty of obtaining approvals and social licenses, thereby influencing the pace of project advancement.
07 Outlook
Three Indicators to Track Progress
Tracking Point 1: Peruvian Uranium Mining Regulations. Whether Peru enacts dedicated laws and technical protocols for uranium mining will directly determine whether the Macusani uranium project can commence operations, as well as how uranium-bearing tailings and dust at Falchani are regulated.
Tracking Point 2: Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Financing for Falchani. The project is scheduled to begin construction in 2028, having previously been targeted for 2027, indicating a delay in the timeline. Subsequent progress will depend on the status of EIA approvals and whether funding for the refinery has been secured.
Tracking Point 3: Follow-up Mechanisms for Quadrilateral Cooperation. Translating the joint declaration into practical cooperation requires standing working mechanisms, shared infrastructure, and multilateral financing arrangements. Additionally, if the proposal to establish the Quelccaya National Park enters the legislative process, it may alter the development boundaries for surrounding mining concessions.
Resources lie underground; rules govern above ground.
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