Resource Nationalism in 2026: A Four-Country Comparative Analysis
Resource Nationalism in 2026: A Horizontal Comparison Among Four Countries
Gabon, Ghana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Indonesia—Four Variations on the Same Script, and Where Each Gets Stuck
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| Core Summary In 2026, resource nationalism has evolved from isolated incidents into a systemic movement covering major resource-producing countries worldwide. This article provides a horizontal comparison of four most representative cases: Gabon is leveraging a "ban on raw ore exports by 2029 + domestic processing target for 2031" to compel Eramet to fulfill its investment commitments; Ghana is advancing reforms with a direction of "no raw ore exports by 2030," having already reclaimed mining rights at the Damang gold mine and facing a stalemate with Gold Fields over the renewal of the Tarkwa lease; the DRC signed its fourth concentrate export ban on June 29, 2026, while simultaneously implementing a quota system for cobalt; Indonesia has compressed total nickel mining volumes by more than 30% year-on-year through RKAB quota approval powers. The demands of these four countries are highly consistent—to retain high value-added processing stages within their own borders, shifting from "granting extraction rights" to "securing larger revenue shares"—but the intensity of execution, policy tools, and implementation outcomes vary significantly. Understanding these differences is essential to determining which policies will genuinely alter supply dynamics and which are merely bargaining chips. |
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| Panorama |
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◎ I. First, View the Panorama: This Is No Longer an Isolated Behavior by a Few Countries
Before diving into the four-country comparison, it is necessary to confirm one thing: this is a systemic movement, not a series of sporadic events. According to a compilation of public reports, at least 12 African countries have successively enacted policies restricting raw ore or primary concentrate exports and promoting local processing over the past year and a half. The market refers to this as the "African Ore Lock-in Wave." The policy templates are highly similar: restrictions apply only to raw ores and rough concentrates; refined products after smelting and purification remain unrestricted; foreign investors must build factories locally, and governments mandate equity stakes of 10%-15%; violators face confiscation of goods, heavy fines, or even revocation of mining rights.
Viewing several typical cases side-by-side makes the universality of this template obvious: Kenya issued a presidential decree in April 2026 banning exports of all categories of raw ores including gold, copper, iron, and rare earths; Malawi issued a presidential decree in October 2025 prohibiting exports of all categories of raw ores including uranium, rare earths, graphite, gold, and copper, with no buffer period; Zimbabwe released the "Mineral Classification and Declaration" on May 28, 2026, imposing zero exports of raw ores for 14 critical minerals including lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, copper, and rare earths, and mandating state Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) participation in newly established mining enterprises; Guinea compressed total bauxite exports from 183 million tons in 2025 to 150 million tons in 2026, a decrease of 18%. Against this backdrop, the four samples selected in this article precisely represent four different approaches and levels of maturity within this movement.
| Country | Core Policy | Timeline | Tool Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gabon | Ban on Raw Manganese Exports + Domestic Processing Roadmap | Ban by 2029 / 700k tons by 2031 | Ban + Negotiation Agreement |
| Ghana | Gradual Tightening of Raw Ore Exports + Mining Lease Renewal Control | Direction toward 2030 / Tarkwa expires in 2027 | Licenses + Mine Lease Expiry |
| DRC | Copper-Cobalt Concentrate Export Ban + Cobalt Quota System | Effective immediately on June 29, 2026 | Dual Track: Ban + Quotas |
| Indonesia | RKAB Quota Compression + Zero Export of Critical Minerals | 2026 Quotas Reduced by >30% YoY | Administrative Approval Power |
| Gabon |
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◎ II. Gabon: Three Years of Preparation Period, Followed by Signing a Roadmap
Gabon’s approach is the most "consultative" among the four countries. On June 2, 2025, the Gabonese government announced a comprehensive ban on the export of unprocessed raw manganese starting January 1, 2029, granting the industry a three-year preparation period. This news impacted Eramet’s stock price on the same day—the company’s share price plunged by up to 5.5%, closing down approximately 4%. Gabon’s significance cannot be underestimated: it is the world’s second-largest manganese producer. Eramet operates one of the largest manganese mining businesses locally through its subsidiary Comilog, which, together with its railway subsidiary Setrag, sustains 10,460 local jobs in Gabon.
Rather than moving toward confrontation after the ban announcement, both parties moved to the negotiating table. On July 20, 2026, witnessed by Gabonese President Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema and French President Emmanuel Macron, Eramet and the Gabonese government signed a Structural Memorandum of Understanding in Paris—the "Made in Gabon" domestic processing roadmap: the goal is to achieve up to 700,000 tons per year of domestic manganese processing capacity by the end of 2031; establish a structured framework to supervise the economic feasibility conditions required for project implementation, where energy accessibility is a key prerequisite guaranteed by the Gabonese government; develop a local biochar industry chain; launch an industrial seed fund aimed at creating approximately 3,000 industrial jobs.
More noteworthy is the practical implementation at the technical level—Eramet is continuously advancing industrial testing of bio-reductants in Gabon, utilizing biomass made from local forestry waste to replace imported metallurgical coke. The significance of this path lies in simultaneously solving three problems: reducing carbon emissions, decreasing import dependence, and finding a use for forestry waste. The characteristic of the Gabon model is "first legislate deadlines, then negotiate pathways, and finally implement technology." These three steps are relatively solid, and corporate cooperation is high—because Comilog has a history of over 30 years in the country, representing Eramet’s most core asset in its manganese business, leaving the company with no option to exit.
| Ghana |
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◎ III. Ghana: From Reclaiming Mining Rights to Open Conflict
Ghana’s path is notably tougher and more prone to triggering direct confrontations. As Africa’s largest gold-producing country, the core demand of Ghana’s recent mining policy reform is to increase local participation and boost government fiscal revenue from the mining sector. Its first substantive action was directly reclaiming an operating gold mine.
The mining license for Gold Fields’ Damang gold mine expired in 2025. The Ghanaian government refused to renew it; subsequently, both parties reached an agreement allowing the company to operate for another year to complete an orderly handover; since July 2025, a transition team appointed by government departments has worked collaboratively with company management; on April 18, 2026, Damang was formally handed over to the Ghanaian government. With this precedent, negotiations for the renewal of Tarkwa have become particularly sensitive—Tarkwa is Gold Fields’ second-largest gold-producing mine in the first half of 2026, contributing production of 192,000 ounces, accounting for approximately 15% of the group’s total output. Its five mining leases are set to expire in April 2027.
Conflict became public on August 19, 2026. During an earnings call, Gold Fields CEO Mike Fraser directly criticized the Ghanaian government for treating the mining sector as a "easy catch" for revenue generation and admitted that there remained uncertainty regarding both the timeline and specific terms of the Tarkwa lease renewal. His remarks went beyond mere complaint: “This is our last resort, but it is necessary to make it clear to shareholders that if required, we will indeed take appropriate measures to protect company value.” He simultaneously emphasized that an unfavorable outcome in the renewal process would have a “material and adverse impact” on the company, which was interpreted by external observers as leaving room for potential legal or arbitration avenues.
| The Ghanaian side was not entirely silent. Isaac Andrews Tandoh, CEO of the Minerals Commission of Ghana, had previously denied that the government was delaying the lease renewal, stating that officials had held talks with Gold Fields while explicitly ruling out the possibility of “automatic renewal,” requiring the company to first submit development plans to the Commission’s technical committee and relevant ministers. This indicates a fundamental divergence in how the two sides understand “progress”—the enterprise believes that submitting an application should elicit a response, whereas the government views the approval process itself as a renegotiation of conditions. |
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A comparison with Gabon reveals that the hallmark of the Ghana model is “using mine right expiration as leverage”—new legislation is not required; simply setting conditions during the renewal phase achieves the same policy objectives. For the government, this approach entails minimal cost and maximum initiative, but the price is a rapid erosion of corporate trust and potential international arbitration risks. Fraser had previously acknowledged at the African Mining Summit in February that relations between the company and Ghanaian authorities had become strained due to the government’s tightening of controls over the local gold mining industry.
| DRC |
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◎ IV. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): The Fourth Ban, Which Abolished All Previous Exemptions
The DRC is the country among the four with the most diverse policy tools and the most frequent implementation. Regarding the concentrate export ban alone, this marks the fourth instance—the country had previously imposed bans on copper and cobalt concentrate exports in 2013, 2019, and 2023, granting broad exemptions each time due to insufficient domestic smelting capacity. The key distinction this time lies in the Joint Ministerial Order signed on June 29, 2026, which abolished the previous 2023 order and all its exemption clauses, replacing them with a broader framework regulating mineral product exports and taxes on economically significant mining by-products.
The ban triggered market shockwaves on August 6, 2026—on the day the news was announced, LME copper prices rose more than 1% to $14,369.5 per tonne, approaching historical highs. However, in terms of actual impact, the shock may be less severe than the market’s initial reaction: official data shows that in Q1 2026, the DRC exported 696,725 tonnes of cathode copper, while copper concentrate exports amounted to only 53,926 tonnes (containing 18,863 tonnes of copper metal); concurrently, it exported 51,940 tonnes of cobalt hydroxide products (containing 17,054 tonnes of cobalt metal). In other words, the majority of the country’s copper and cobalt are already refined domestically; the ban targets only primary concentrates, while smelted finished products such as cathode copper and cobalt hydroxide remain eligible for export.
The truly impactful policy in the DRC is actually the cobalt quota system. The country implemented a cobalt export ban starting in February 2025, extended it by three months in June, and only converted it to a quota system on October 16, 2025; the quota scheme stipulates that up to 18,125 tonnes of cobalt could be transported for the remainder of 2025, with annual caps set at 96,600 tonnes for both 2026 and 2027. The sophistication of this system lies in its direct linkage of quotas to local investment—the DRC’s Strategic Minerals Regulatory Authority explicitly stated that future export quotas granted to mining companies may be adjusted based on their “contribution to the development of the country’s strategic projects,” particularly regarding contributions to developing high-value-added cobalt processing capacity locally. The effect was immediate: when the ban was introduced, the benchmark cobalt price had fallen below $10 per pound, after which it doubled, and the price of the main export product, cobalt hydroxide, increased by more than threefold.
Furthermore, the DRC is expanding the definition boundary of “strategic minerals”—in early June 2026, the Council of Ministers approved a decree formally adding six categories of minerals—lithium, tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, and rare earths—to the national strategic minerals list; according to the country’s Mining Code, strategic minerals are subject to a 10% royalty tax rate, whereas the standard rate for base metals is 3.5%, meaning royalty expenditures for related enterprises will rise to approximately three times the original level.
| Indonesia |
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◎ V. Indonesia: No Bans, But Administrative Approval Powers
Indonesia offers a fourth paradigm—it hardly needs to invoke the word “ban”; relying solely on an administrative approval system achieves equivalent control. This tool is the RKAB (Annual Work Plan and Budget) quota approval.
The power of the RKAB manifests on several levels. First is total volume compression: the nationwide nickel ore RKAB mining quota for 2026 was reduced by more than 30% compared to 2025; Indonesia’s 2026 nickel ore quota cap was set at approximately 260–270 million tonnes, whereas this figure stood at 379 million tonnes in 2025. Second is the scarcity of declaration windows: under current Indonesian mineral management regulations, the quota modification declaration channel opens only once a year in July, with no supplementary declaration channels available for the rest of the year; enterprises wishing to increase production volumes must submit complete revision materials within the entire month-long window in July for unified review by the Directorate General of Minerals and Coal.
Third, and most critically, the approval standards themselves serve as industrial policy tools. Policies explicitly state that quota approvals will prioritize matching domestic downstream smelting capacity, raising the scrutiny threshold for production increase applications from purely export-oriented mining enterprises, thereby restricting disorderly expansion of nickel ore output from an institutional perspective; some observations also note that enterprises paying higher mining royalties may receive priority in quota approvals, helping the government maximize fiscal revenue while maintaining production levels. The lag in approval itself constitutes a constraint—industry insiders point out that if approvals are issued in August, mining companies will have very limited time to execute additional production plans, “leaving only four months, plus the rainy season.”
Beyond the RKAB, Indonesia is also advancing more traditional resource nationalism tools: the “Mineral Classification and Declaration” released on May 28, 2026, stipulates zero exports of raw ores for 14 critical minerals including lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, copper, and rare earths; newly established mining enterprises are mandated to include state SPV participation, and obtaining mining permits requires submitting processing plant timelines; meanwhile, a transition began on June 1, 2026, with full implementation on January 1, 2027, designating state-owned enterprises as the sole export window for palm oil, coal, and ferroalloys. However, there were compromises—NPI (Nickel Pig Iron) was exempted from the unified state-owned enterprise export arrangement, which was viewed as a localized victory for Chinese enterprises in Indonesia.
| Comparison |
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◎ VI. Four-Country Comparison: Tools, Intensity, and Real Constraints
Placing the four samples on the same comparative table reveals a clear spectrum: from Gabon’s “consultative” approach, to Ghana’s “leveraged” approach, to the DRC’s “quota-based” approach, and finally to Indonesia’s “approval-based” approach, the mandatory nature of policies increases sequentially, while corporate predictability decreases sequentially.
| Dimension | Gabon | Ghana | DRC | Indonesia |
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| Core Instrument | Ban + Roadmap | Mining Right Renewal | Ban + Quotas | RKAB Approval |
| Buffer Period | Three years (until 2029) | No clear buffer | Immediate effect | Annual rolling basis |
| Corporate Relations | Negotiated, high cooperation | Open conflict | Quotas linked to investment | Administrative game/struggle |
| Actual Binding Force | Medium (to be verified) | High (mining rights already reclaimed) | High (cobalt prices doubled) | Extremely high (total volume down 30%+) |
| Main Risks | Whether energy security guarantees can be fulfilled | International arbitration risks | Lack of transparency in exemption approvals | Approval delays and uncertainty |
Looking at implementation results, the performance records of the four countries vary significantly. Indonesia demonstrates the strongest execution capability—quotas directly compressed output by over 30%, and by linking "increased equity ownership" with "local processing investment" through approval standards, it truly altered the supply curve. The cobalt quota system in the DRC was also effective, driving prices from below $10/lb to double, with cobalt hydroxide rising more than threefold; however, the actual impact of the copper concentrate ban has been limited because the vast majority of the country's copper and cobalt are already refined domestically. Ghana’s reclamation of the Damang mining rights demonstrates its willingness to take serious action, but the stalemate at Tarkwa exposes the costs of this approach—companies are beginning to prepare legal avenues, which will likely impair future investment willingness. Gabon’s roadmap appears the most rational, but its 700,000-tonne local processing capacity will not materialize until 2031, leaving significant execution risks in between, particularly regarding whether the government’s promised energy security guarantees can be delivered.
| Assessment |
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◎ VII. Judgments and Recommendations: How Companies Should Respond to This Movement
Synthesizing the samples from the four countries allows for several relatively certain judgments. First, this movement is irreversible. Its drivers are the fiscal pressures and industrial upgrading demands generally faced by resource-rich nations, rather than temporary policies of a specific administration; political cycle changes have not altered policy directions in Gabon, Ghana, or Indonesia. Second, "local processing investment" is becoming a new barrier to entry—the DRC links quotas to contributions to local processing, Indonesia links RKAB approvals to matching downstream capacity, Zimbabwe requires submission of processing plant timelines, and Guinea requires cooperation in building alumina plants; the logic is entirely consistent.
Third, and perhaps the most overlooked point: there is a massive gap between the "announcement" of policy and its "execution," and this gap itself is central to investment judgment. Guinea’s bauxite quota policy, whose detailed rules were published in April 2026, has missed deadlines multiple times; Ghana’s Tarkwa renewal has dragged on for over half a year without an official response; historically, all three bans in the DRC resulted in widespread exemptions due to insufficient domestic smelting capacity. Therefore, when assessing such policies, the real question is not "what does the policy say," but "does this country have the capacity to bear the cost of policy implementation?" In countries with insufficient local processing capacity, heavy fiscal reliance on export revenues, and high employment pressures, the actual enforcement intensity of bans is usually discounted.
Three specific recommendations for Chinese enterprises: First, upgrade "local processing commitments" from negotiation chips to actual investments. Zhongkuang Resources’ commitment to invest $350 million to build a 100,000-tonne lithium sulfate plant in Zimbabwe, and Huayou Cobalt’s construction of Africa’s first lithium sulfate factory in Zimbabwe, are examples of using real investment/contribution to secure quota space. Second, assess mining right expiration timelines in advance—the cases of Ghana’s Damang and Tarkwa demonstrate that the mining right renewal period is the window where resource nationalism policy risks are most concentrated; preparation must begin 2-3 years before expiration, rather than waiting until the last minute to negotiate. Third, diversify production site layouts to avoid excessive exposure to any single country. The risk premium for high-concentration dependencies such as Indonesian nickel, Guinean bauxite, and DRC cobalt is systematically rising under the wave of resource nationalism.
The four nodes most worthy of tracking next are: whether Ghana can provide an official response before the Tarkwa lease expires in April 2027; the actual issuance status of strategic exemption approvals for the DRC’s copper concentrate ban; the final approved scale of Indonesia’s 2026 RKAB revised quotas; and whether Gabon’s three industrial schemes will sequentially pass evaluation to enter final investment decisions. The trajectory of these four nodes will jointly determine the tightness or looseness of the global critical minerals supply landscape in 2027.
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"The question resource countries are now asking is no longer 'how much money are you giving,' but 'what have you built here.'"
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