South African Manganese Miners Unite to Push for Railway Reform: Will This Time Be Different, or Just More Thunder with Little Rain?
Behind the “12×12” plan lies the reality that nearly 10 million tonnes of manganese ore will still rely on truck transport in 2025. This time, miners are bringing capital and long-term commitments to the table. However, similar reform promises have failed more than once in South Africa previously.
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| Key Summary · On September 14, the Manganese Producers Consortium (MPC) publicly demanded accelerated railway reform for manganese, directly targeting the government’s Phase III of the Public-Private Growth and Employment Partnership (PP-GEP). · The scheme sets hard targets: a Private Sector Participation (PSP) transaction for manganese railways must be brought to market by December 2026, and the National Rail Act must be submitted to Parliament by March 2027. · Miners proposed the “12×12” corridor strategy: achieving approximately 12 million tonnes per year (mtpa) of transport capacity via two routes—Saldanha and Gqeberha—totaling 24 million tonnes. · Miner Perspective: This time, miners are entering the fray proactively with “capital, committed volumes, and long-term railway quota arrangements,” making it more binding than previous mere policy rhetoric. However, given that South African railway privatization has been delayed multiple times before, it remains to be seen whether the hard deadline in December can truly be met. · A comparative sample: The timetable for mainline operations by 11 private train operators has already been pushed back from “by the end of 2026” to “April 2027.” |
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Trigger: Unprecedented Joint Voice from Miners – A “Test That Cannot Fail”
On September 14, the Manganese Producers Consortium (MPC) issued a public statement demanding accelerated progress on manganese railway reform, directly targeting the government’s Phase III of the Public-Private Growth and Employment Partnership (PP-GEP), launched on August 20. This phase lists freight logistics as a foundational support for driving economic growth of over 3% and creating 1 million new jobs by 2030. In its statement, the MPC explicitly stated that this is “a concrete test with clear deadlines” for whether Phase III can translate intent into action. Such direct wording is uncommon in public statements from the South African mining industry.
According to the timeline set by the Phase III scorecard, a manganese Private Sector Participation (PSP) transaction must be brought to market by the end of this year, the National Rail Act must be submitted to Parliament by March 2027, and the Transport Economic Regulator must be fully operational by the same timeframe. The MPC stated that the construction of the new manganese terminal at the Port of Gqeberha (Ngqura) and the PSP projects for the ore export corridor connecting Sishen in the Northern Cape to the Port of Saldanha “cannot be delayed any further.”
The MPC also emphasized its sincerity: miners are ready to bring capital, predetermined committed volumes, and long-term railway quota arrangements to support bankable projects. This stance clearly aims to transform the old problem of “reform being just talk” into specific transactions backed by real money. This distinction is what sets this current call to action apart from previous industry appeals.
Background: South Africa Holds 70% of Global Manganese Resources, Yet Nearly 10 Million Tonnes Rely on Truck Transport
South Africa’s position in the global map of manganese resources is unrivaled: the country holds approximately 70% of the world’s manganese resources, primarily concentrated in the Kalahari Manganese Field. In 2025, South Africa’s manganese exports reached a historic record of 26.2 million tonnes. However, even in this bumper year, approximately 10 million tonnes of manganese ore—nearly 40% of the total export volume—still relied on road transport for the final leg from inland mines to ports. This proportion itself illustrates that in South Africa, producing ores and transporting them out are never the same thing.
Road transport not only incurs high costs but also continuously erodes the already thin profit margins of miners. This is why railway reform is not merely an icing-on-the-cake issue for the manganese industry, but a matter of survival. The planned new manganese terminal at Ngqura has a designed annual throughput capacity of approximately 16 million tonnes, equivalent to more than 60% of South Africa’s 2025 manganese export volume. Once completed, it would theoretically be sufficient to absorb the entire gap currently filled by road transport.
Transnet is simultaneously ramping up infrastructure investment: disclosed plans indicate that Transnet intends to invest approximately ZAR 127 billion in capital expenditure on railway and port infrastructure over the next five years. This funding covers not only the manganese corridor but also upgrades to the transport networks for other bulk commodities such as coal and containers. The miners’ demands are essentially about securing priority implementation order for their sector within this massive investment plan, rather than being pushed to the back of the queue behind other more prominent categories like coal and containers.
Breakdown: The “12×12” Plan Deconstructed – Two Routes, Two Roles
The “12×12” corridor strategy proposed by the MPC specifically breaks down into two complementary export paths: one via the Port of Saldanha, relying on the ore export corridor connecting Sishen and Saldanha, with a target transport capacity of approximately 12 mtpa; and the other via the Port of Gqeberha (where the Ngqura manganese terminal is located), also targeting approximately 12 mtpa. Together, they total approximately 24 mtpa. This aggregate volume is roughly equivalent to South Africa’s 2025 manganese export total, meaning that if the plan is implemented, the nearly 10-million-tonne gap in road transport could theoretically be completely absorbed, leaving room for growth. This is why the MPC refers to it as a “demand-driven, investable path”—it is not merely government-planned capacity, but figures calculated by miners themselves, willing to support with real orders and volumes.
| Corridor/Project | Key Data | Current Status |
|---|---|---|
| Sishen–Saldanha Ore Export Corridor | Target approx. 12 mtpa | MPC seeks private sector participation, included within the scope of Phase III PSP transactions |
| New Ngqura (Gqeberha) Manganese Terminal | Designed throughput capacity approx. 16 mtpa; manganese target in “12×12” plan approx. 12 mtpa | Assmang, under African Rainbow Minerals (ARM), has joined other major producers in bidding |
| MPC Consortium Itself | Members collectively contribute over 60% of South Africa’s manganese export volume | Any manganese producer holding a valid mining right may apply to become a shareholder |
Notably, the 16 mtpa design total throughput capacity of the Ngqura terminal is not the same figure as the 12 mtpa manganese target for the Gqeberha route in the “12×12” plan—the former is the overall design capacity of the port terminal, while the latter is the transport target set separately by the miner consortium for the single commodity of manganese. The difference between these two figures leaves room for subsequent growth in other mineral types or production capacity. This point is often conflated in reports and discussions and deserves separate clarification.
From the perspective of the bidding landscape, African Rainbow Minerals (ARM) has clearly stated that it will participate in the bid for the Ngqura Terminal concession through a consortium comprising its manganese business, Assmang, and other major South African manganese producers. Industry analysts point out that if port capacity fails to keep pace, South African manganese exporters risk gradually ceding market share to competitors in Australia and Gabon in the global market. This is precisely why supply chain efficiency has been repeatedly emphasized within the industry as a "critical variable determining whether future growth volumes for this commodity can be realized," rather than merely a logistical detail.
Lesson Four: “South Africa Has Previously Established Partnerships, Released Plans, and Set Targets”
This self-reminder from MPC in its statement serves as a condensed history of infrastructure reform in South Africa: “This risk is not unfamiliar. South Africa has previously established partnerships, released plans, and set targets.” The fact that these words come from the mining consortium itself, rather than external critics, indicates that the industry holds a highly prudent attitude toward the government’s ability to fulfill its reform commitments.
Real-world progress confirms that this prudence is well-founded: By mid-year this year, 11 private Train Operating Companies (TOCs) had signed track access agreements with the railway infrastructure management authority under Transnet. While some operators had originally planned to commence mainline operations by the end of 2026, South African Transport Minister Fikile Mbalula publicly stated on July 6 that new operators would only officially begin operations in April 2027—the timeline has already been delayed by at least several months compared to initial expectations.
The combined target capacity of these 11 operators also warrants attention: These private train operators cover coal, manganese, containers, fuel, and general freight, with a combined goal of injecting 20–24 million tons of immediate freight capacity into the South African rail network, followed by continued scale expansion. However, as industry analysis points out, a “train schedule” and an actual running train are two different things; obtaining slot allocations does not cause ore to move automatically. Miners will only feel tangible cost improvements when these slots are truly converted into actual train services, reduce road transport volumes, and when ports possess the capacity to handle the cargo.
Comparison Five: Road vs. Rail: Completely Different Cost Structures for the Same Ore
Comparing road transport and rail transport side-by-side makes it easier to understand why miners are willing to proactively provide funding and long-term commitments to drive this reform, rather than continuing to wait and watch for unilateral government advancement:
| Dimension | Road Transport (Current Partial Dependence) | Post-Rail Reform (Target State) |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Carried Volume | Approx. 10 million tons (nearly 40% of total exports) | “12x12” Plan Target: Combined approx. 24 million tons/year |
| Unit Cost Trend | Long-distance trucking costs continue to erode miner profits | Economies of scale in rail transport are typically significantly lower than road |
| Road Transport Share Target for Joint Venture Mine | — | Industry Target: Reduce below 30% by end of 2027 (referencing Tshipi Borwa mine) |
| Operating Entity | Dispersed road transport carriers | Private Train Operating Companies (TOC) + National Railway Infrastructure |
This cost differential is not unique to South Africa but is a universal principle in the commodities industry: For long-distance, high-volume dry bulk transport, the unit cost advantage of rail further amplifies as distance increases, while road transport is generally suitable only for short-haul feeder services or emergency dispatches. Since South Africa’s primary manganese production areas are generally more than 500 km from ports, the cost disadvantage of road transport is significantly amplified at this distance level. This is why miners are willing to proactively offer long-term committed volumes in exchange for priority rail capacity guarantees, rather than continuing to rely on short-term, flexible, but expensive road dispatches.
Assessment Six: Mineral Cube Judgment: Constraints Are Stronger This Time, But December Remains a Real Test
Mineral Cube’s assessment is that, compared to previous models where the government unilaterally issued plans and enterprises passively waited, miners entering the field this time with capital, committed volumes, and long-term rail quota arrangements themselves constitute a stronger signal of constraint—after all, MPC members are direct users of future throughput for projects like the Ngqura Terminal. The motivation to deliver here is incomparable to past mere policy declarations. This “investor-as-user” structural design theoretically reduces the principal-agent problems common in infrastructure projects—where disconnects between builders and users lead to repeated delays in construction schedules. This represents the most noteworthy institutional innovation in this round of reform.
However, historical baggage remains real: The mainline operation timeline for private train operating companies has already been delayed from “by the end of 2026” to “April 2027.” This indicates that even after agreements are signed and targets are set, there remains a significant execution lag between paper commitments and actual operations. The milestone of pushing the manganese PSP transaction to market in December essentially marks only the start of the transaction process; between this point and the realization of actual additional capacity, there is likely a one-to-two-year period of construction and ramp-up.
Looking at a longer cycle, even if the December PSP transaction proceeds to market as scheduled, from transaction launch, tender evaluation, and concession award, to actual completion of construction and commercial operation of the terminal and railways, the industry generally expects projects like the Ngqura Terminal to truly enter commercial operation only by the late 2020s. This means that even if this round of reform proceeds entirely according to plan, a substantial decrease in road transport share is unlikely to materialize quickly within one or two years; it is more likely to be a gradual process spanning several years.
Outlook Seven: 3 Tracking Signals
Rather than stopping at the conclusion that “miners have spoken,” it is more valuable to track specific nodes that verify whether reform is truly accelerating, because South Africa’s infrastructure reform history has repeatedly proven that statements and hearings are never lacking; what is lacking are timelines that can be fulfilled as scheduled—
Tracking Point One: Monitor whether the manganese PSP transaction is pushed to market as scheduled in December 2026. This is the first hard indicator to test whether Phase Three of the Scorecard truly possesses binding force, and it is the most significant node worth recording for the entire year.
Tracking Point Two: Track whether the 11 private train operating companies can achieve mainline operations as scheduled in April 2027. This date has already experienced one delay and serves as a direct reference for judging the credibility of all subsequent timelines.
Tracking Point Three: Pay attention to the bidding and financing progress for the Ngqura manganese terminal, as well as the actual rate of decline in road transport share for mines such as Tshipi Borwa. These two data points reflect the implementation pace of the “12x12” plan better than any statement and serve as the ultimate test standard for determining whether South Africa’s manganese supply chain efficiency can truly improve.
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South Africa never lacks resources or plans; what it lacks is turning paper timelines into ships actually berthing and loading cargo in the port.
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