A midstream product that no one is watching is simultaneously choking copper, lithium, cobalt, and rare earths—the other half of the Strait of Hormuz story.

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Core Summary Over the past six months, the market has viewed the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz as a story about oil and natural gas. But it has another half, which almost no one has discussed seriously: The Middle East accounts for approximately 24% (about 83.87 million tons) of global sulfur production, and half of global seaborne sulfur trade must be exported via the Strait of Hormuz. Sulfur is the raw material for sulfuric acid, which is a fundamental reagent that cannot be bypassed in almost all hydrometallurgical processes. As a result—since the outbreak of the Iran war—sulfur prices have risen by more than 50%, and sulfuric acid prices in some regions have more than doubled; spot sulfuric acid prices in Indonesia and Chile have climbed to above $380/ton and $440/ton, respectively. A more critical assessment comes from Benchmark: More than half of the global capacity for lithium, cobalt, rare earths, and purified phosphoric acid (PPA) expected to be produced in 2026 is exposed to the risk of sulfur and sulfuric acid supply disruptions; and high-purity manganese sulfate (HPMSM) used for batteries relies 100% on sulfuric acid for its supply. This is no longer just a question of chemical product pricing, but a single-point failure risk for the entire energy transition industry chain.
Blind Spot

◎ I. The Other Half of the Strait of Hormuz Story: Not Just Oil

When markets discuss a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, attention is focused almost entirely on crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). However, the International Energy Agency (IEA) explicitly identified another overlooked transmission chain in its 2026 Global Critical Minerals Outlook: Although the primary impact of this conflict is concentrated in the oil and gas markets, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has also caused significant shocks to mineral and metal markets, particularly affecting aluminum, sulfur, and helium. The aluminum segment has already been fully priced in—the Middle East accounts for approximately 8% of global aluminum production, and production cuts at multiple regional smelters have added fuel to an already tight market. But the sulfur line did not begin to be discussed seriously until mid-2026.

The numbers alone are sufficient to illustrate the problem. Middle Eastern supplies account for roughly one-quarter of global sulfur production, while half of global seaborne sulfur trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. The source of sulfur also explains why it is deeply bound to the Middle East—sulfur primarily originates as a toxic byproduct, hydrogen sulfide, generated during oil and gas refining, which is then processed into pure yellow sulfur. In other words, since the Middle East is both the world's largest oil and gas producing region, it naturally becomes the world's largest producer of sulfur by-products. The geographic concentration of this supply chain was determined by the structure of the petroleum industry from the outset.

Transmission

◎ II. Sulfur → Sulfuric Acid → Critical Minerals: An Undervalued Transmission Chain

Sulfur itself does not directly enter batteries or motors; its key role lies in manufacturing sulfuric acid. Sulfuric acid is an indispensable basic raw material for fertilizer production and the processing of a series of critical minerals including copper, lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths. In the mining sector, sulfuric acid is mainly used in the leaching process—treating ores with acid to allow metals to dissolve, separate, and be recovered. This determines that its scope of influence has a clear boundary: The importance of sulfuric acid is concentrated in processes that recover metals through leaching rather than simple smelting, which is precisely why shortages severely impact nickel, copper, uranium, and some rare earth projects.

Price increase data quantifies the tension along this transmission chain. According to Benchmark data, from the outbreak of the Middle East conflict in late February to mid-April, sulfuric acid prices rose by more than double, and sulfur prices increased by 50% (with variations across regions). Policy actions in China further amplified the pressure—disruptions to sulfur supplies prompted China to tighten sulfuric acid exports in May 2026, creating ripple effects across both the mineral and fertilizer value chains; unofficial restrictions on Chinese sulfuric acid exports exacerbated pressures on refiners outside China. The result was a differentiated surge in spot prices globally: spot sulfuric acid prices in Indonesia and Chile climbed to above $380/ton and $440/ton, respectively, as converters scrambled to find alternative supplies.

Benchmark Raw Materials Research Manager Will Talbot’s statement highlights the essence of the issue: “Sulfuric acid is an important raw material for many critical minerals. Disturbances in the sulfur market due to ongoing conflicts in the Middle East have already triggered chain reactions in several key markets.” His subsequent addition is even more alarming: “The prominent risk is that more critical mineral participants will be forced to reduce production or even completely shut down operations.” This elevates the issue from “rising costs” to the level of “capacity survival.”
Exposure

◎ III. Who Is Most Vulnerable: An Exposure Map

Benchmark’s core conclusion consists of specific exposure figures: More than half of the global capacity for lithium, cobalt, rare earths, and purified phosphoric acid (PPA) expected to be produced in 2026 is exposed to shocks in the sulfur and sulfuric acid markets. Among specific varieties, the most extreme exposure is found in battery-grade manganese materials—high-purity manganese sulfate (HPMSM) used in manganese-containing batteries relies 100% on sulfuric acid for its supply. This “100%” means that the HPMSM segment has absolutely no buffer space.

Differences in vulnerability among different varieties essentially depend on their process routes. The overall exposure of the nickel market is relatively low, but Indonesia’s rapidly growing HPAL (High-Pressure Acid Leach) industry heavily relies on importing sulfur from the Middle East to produce acid on-site—this is precisely one of the main sources of current cost pressures in Indonesia’s nickel industry. In the lithium sector, changes in cost structure are the most intuitive: In hard-rock lithium processing, sulfuric acid currently accounts for approximately 11% of operating costs, whereas this proportion was only about 3% before the disruption; sulfuric acid has become the single largest cost component. This jump from 3% to 11% is the most crucial clue for understanding the rise in lithium salt costs in this round.

VarietySulfuric Acid ExposureKey Notes
High-Purity Manganese Sulfate (HPMSM)100%Completely dependent on sulfuric acid, no buffer space
Lithium, Cobalt, Rare Earths, Purified Phosphoric AcidOver 50% of capacity exposedBenchmark 2026 estimate
Hard-Rock Lithium ProcessingSulfuric acid accounts for approx. 11% of operating costsWas only approx. 3% before disruption, now the largest single cost item
Nickel (HPAL Route)Highly dependentIndonesian HPAL requires Middle Eastern sulfur to produce acid on-site
Copper (Oxide Ore Leaching)Highly dependentForced shutdown if acid shortage exceeds three weeks

Copper: A Critical Vulnerability

The situation with copper is particularly noteworthy because it involves Africa’s core production regions. Robert Friedland, founder and Executive Co-Chair of Ivanhoe Mines, offered a rather direct assessment: “I have heard that traders are already struggling to source any supplies. Therefore, sulfuric acid prices in Africa will rise significantly… If the disruption lasts for more than approximately three weeks, oxide copper operations will be forced to shut down because they will run out of acid.” Africa is precisely the lifeline for global cobalt supply—the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) accounts for approximately 70% of global mined cobalt supply—and cobalt production also requires sulfuric acid. This means that a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could theoretically impact 70% of global cobalt supply simultaneously through sulfuric acid as an intermediate link.

Competition

4. The Overlooked Competitor: Fertilizers Account for 60% of Global Demand

When analyzing the sulfuric acid issue, there is a fact easily overlooked from a mining perspective: when miners compete for sulfuric acid supplies, their direct competitors are the fertilizer industry—which accounts for 60% of global sulfuric acid demand. This ratio implies that the mining sector is actually a relatively secondary buyer in the sulfuric acid market, lacking pricing power during periods of supply tightness.

This elevates the nature of the problem from an industrial issue to a social one. Analysts warn that sustained shortages will not only drive up the cost of agricultural inputs but may also reduce crop yields and exacerbate food insecurity. In other words, a disruption at the Strait of Hormuz is not just a story about the oil market; it is simultaneously a story about metal processing and food security. When mining and agriculture compete for the same raw material in the same tight market, policymakers’ ultimate preference for which party to protect is hardly difficult to guess—this is a realistic risk that mining companies must assess in advance.

More troublingly, the sulfuric acid market was already under tension prior to this Middle East disturbance; prices had risen by 500% before the latest conflict in Iran erupted. That is to say, this shock did not occur in a loose market but was superimposed onto a market that was already stretched thin, with the point of impact falling exactly where approximately one-quarter of global sulfur capacity is located.

Key Points

5. The Greatest Risk Is Not Price, But “Availability”

This sulfur crisis differs fundamentally from ordinary cost increases. Benchmark’s report provides a clear warning: physical availability, rather than price alone, has become the industry’s greatest risk, as at least half of global seaborne sulfur trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. This distinction is crucial—price increases merely compress profits, and companies can choose to absorb them; but if physical sulfur cannot be purchased on the market, no amount of higher bidding can sustain production.

Actual impacts are already becoming apparent: shortages in physical sulfur supply have forced some refiners to cut production. The “three-week” threshold mentioned by Friedland provides a fairly specific time window—for oxide copper operations relying on acid leaching, sulfuric acid inventory typically supports operations for only about three weeks. This means that disruptions exceeding this duration will evolve directly from a “cost issue” into a “shutdown issue.”

Of course, not all companies are exposed equally. Some miners are relatively immune due to different supply sources—for example, Australia, the world’s largest producer of spodumene lithium, sources most of its sulfur from Canada, thus facing limited impact. This highlights an important response direction: the geographic diversification of sulfur supply has been amplified to an unprecedented degree in this crisis—it is no longer merely a cost optimization task for the procurement department, but a strategic issue concerning whether production capacity can continue to operate.

Assessment

6. Judgment and Recommendations: Include Sulfur in Supply Chain Risk Lists

The first layer of judgment concerns the persistence of the impact. As long as the transit status of the Strait of Hormuz does not materially improve, the supply risk for sulfur will not disappear. Unlike oil, sulfur is a by-product of oil and gas refining, and its output cannot respond quickly to price signals through “increased production”—its supply is entirely determined by the level of upstream refining activity. No matter how high prices rise, new sulfur capacity cannot be created out of thin air. This makes the supply elasticity of sulfur even lower than that of crude oil itself.

The second layer of judgment concerns cost pass-through. The proportion of sulfuric acid costs in hard-rock lithium processing has risen from 3% to 11%, making it the single largest cost item—meaning that lithium salt cost curves previously established based on old cost structures need to be revised upward across the board. The same logic applies to Indonesian HPAL nickel, African oxide copper, and DRC cobalt. For all projects relying on hydrometallurgy, the weight of “sulfuric acid” in their cost models needs to be recalibrated; auxiliaries previously viewed as background reagents have now become primary cost drivers.

Four specific recommendations for participants in the value chain:

  1. Include sulfur/sulfuric acid in the supply chain risk list for core raw materials, managing them at the same level as ores and energy, rather than continuing to classify them as “auxiliary materials.”
  2. Assess the geographic concentration of your own sulfur sources—the case of Australian lithium companies relying on Canadian sulfur and remaining relatively immune illustrates that source diversification is the most effective hedging tool.
  3. For projects relying on acid leaching processes, establish a safety stock of sulfuric acid covering at least three weeks or more, which is the shutdown threshold highlighted by Friedland.
  4. When evaluating the economics of new projects, use adjusted sulfuric acid price assumptions rather than pre-crisis historical averages—otherwise, the operating costs of hydrometallurgical projects will be systematically underestimated.

Finally, here are three signals worth tracking continuously:

  1. Whether the transit status of the Strait of Hormuz and seaborne sulfur volumes can recover.
  2. Whether China’s unofficial restrictions on sulfuric acid exports will become formalized or relaxed—as one of the world’s largest producers of sulfuric acid, China’s policy orientation has a very direct impact on overseas refiners.
  3. Whether actual cases will emerge, as warned by Benchmark, of “more critical mineral participants being forced to cut production or even shut down completely”—once such cases begin to appear, the sulfur crisis will escalate from a cost issue to a substantive shock to global critical mineral supply.

In all discussions regarding the energy transition, few would think of a yellow by-product from a refinery. However, if one were to identify a single point of failure capable of choking copper, lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths simultaneously, sulfuric acid would likely be the only answer.

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“The bottleneck of the energy transition may not necessarily lie in the mines—it might also lie in a pile of yellow powder that no one pays attention to.”

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