A trader is investigated, nickel prices jump nearly 4%

Seemingly an isolated enforcement action, but in reality, Indonesia is tightening control over the nickel ore circulation chain

Core Summary ● On November 5, Indonesia’s Special Task Force for Forest Area Rectification (Satgas PKH) announced immediate enforcement actions against enterprises controlled or affiliated with merchant Arif Kurniawan. Preliminary reviews revealed violations in mining, licensing, and forest land use; authorities have begun taking over the relevant forest lands. ● Kurniawan is a former Glencore nickel trader. According to a Bloomberg survey of industry insiders in 2024, he handled approximately one-third of Indonesia’s nickel ore supply that year and held equity interests in at least 20 mining areas alongside partners. ● The news drove LME three-month nickel prices up 3.8% on the day to $16,375 per tonne, reaching an intraday high of $16,415, marking the highest level since September 25; however, this remains approximately 18% lower than the near-$19,900 peak reached in May this year (calculated). ● The background involves tighter quotas: Indonesia’s 2026 nickel ore quota has been raised from 260–270 million tonnes to 290–300 million tonnes, though officials have stated that the 2027 quota will be lower than this year’s; Macquarie expects Indonesia’s total exports of nickel and nickel products to decline by approximately 6% this year. ● MineCube Assessment: This action targets forest land violations but impacts the nickel ore circulation chain. The true impact on supply depends not on a single trader, but on whether the production from seized mining areas can be replaced and how much quota will be approved for 2027.

01 Trigger

One Name Moves Nickel Prices

On November 5, Indonesia’s Special Task Force for Forest Area Rectification (Satgas PKH) issued a statement announcing immediate enforcement actions against enterprises controlled or affiliated with "AK," citing preliminary findings of violations in mining, licensing, and forest land use. Task force spokesperson Barita Simanjuntak subsequently confirmed at a press conference that "AK" refers to merchant Arif Kurniawan.

The task force did not disclose which specific companies, mining areas, or land areas were involved, nor did it specify the types of minerals being extracted. It only stated that it had begun identifying and verifying enterprises within the network and taking over affected lands. Under regulations, this body has the authority to reclaim land, impose administrative fines, and recover assets through civil or criminal proceedings. Authorities also did not allege any connection between Glencore and this enforcement action.

Market reaction was swift. Local media identified Kurniawan as a former Glencore trader who controls a significant share of Indonesia’s nickel ore trade, sparking concerns among markets about raw material shortages. LME three-month nickel rose 3.8% on the day, closing at $16,375 per tonne, with an intraday high of $16,415, setting a new high since September 25; on the same day, copper prices fell 1.3% to $13,828.5 per tonne, dragged down by declines in tech stocks, presenting a completely opposite market movement.

ItemContent
Enforcement AgencyIndonesia Special Task Force for Forest Area Rectification
Announcement DateNovember 5, 2026
TargetEnterprises controlled or affiliated with Arif Kurniawan
ViolationsMining, licensing, and forest land use
Measures TakenIdentification and verification of enterprises, takeover of affected forest lands
Available ToolsLand reclamation, administrative fines, civil and criminal asset recovery
Undisclosed InformationSpecific companies, mining areas, area size, and mineral types involved

02 Background

The Invisible Hub of Nickel Ore Trade

Kurniawan is a low-profile but highly influential figure in Indonesia’s mining sector. He left Glencore more than ten years ago and rapidly grew into Indonesia’s largest nickel ore trader. A Bloomberg report last year, citing industry surveys, stated that in 2024, he handled approximately one-third of Indonesia’s nickel ore supply and held equity interests in at least 20 mining areas alongside a key partner.

The role of nickel ore traders is unique within Indonesia’s industrial structure. Since 2020, Indonesia has banned the export of raw nickel ore; all laterite nickel ore produced by mines is sold domestically to smelters. Many small and medium-sized mines lack direct channels to connect with large smelter parks, requiring traders to facilitate deals, provide financing, and organize transportation. Traders link dispersed mining rights on one end to concentrated smelting capacity on the other; if this hub encounters problems, the supply chain between mines and smelters must be rebuilt.

This is the source of market concern. If the seized forest lands involve active mining areas within his network, these volumes would exit the market in the short term; even if only the trading segment is affected, smelters will need time to find alternative sources, during which domestic nickel ore premiums may rise.

ItemSituation
IdentityFormer Glencore nickel trader
Departure from GlencoreMore than ten years ago
2024 Market ShareApproximately one-third of Indonesia’s nickel ore supply
Mining Area InterestsHolds interests in at least 20 mining areas with partners
Public ImageLow-profile operations

03 Analysis

The Task Force’s Enforcement Record

The Special Task Force for Forest Area Rectification was established under Presidential Regulation No. 5 of 2025, led by Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, with the specific mandate to clear unlicensed plantations and mines operating within forest areas. By the end of 2025, the task force had taken over approximately 4.1 million hectares of illegal plantations and mining areas, an area comparable in size to the Netherlands.

The nickel industry is not the first to be singled out. In September 2025, the task force took over 148.25 hectares of land from the Weda Bay nickel mine, a joint venture between Tsingshan Holding Group, Eramet, and Indonesian state-owned enterprises, citing a lack of forest land borrowing permits; simultaneously, 172.82 hectares belonging to Tonia Mitra Sejahtera in Bombana, Southeast Sulawesi, were also taken over. Notably, Eramet stated at the time that the seized portion of Weda Bay was a quarry providing stone materials for construction and maintenance, and mining operations were unaffected; the total area of this mining area is approximately 45,000 hectares, meaning the seized portion represents a very small fraction. Subsequently, four nickel mining enterprises in North Maluku province—Weda Bay, Halmahera Sukses Mineral, Trimegah Bangun Persada, and Karya Wijaya—were penalized for failing to obtain forest land use permits. As of December 8, 2025, the task force had issued administrative fines totaling IDR 38.9 trillion to 71 palm oil and mining enterprises, including 22 mining companies; according to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, the fine standard for illegal mining in forest areas is IDR 6.5 billion per hectare.

Enforcement intensity is increasing. At a handover ceremony, the task force transferred recovered funds amounting to IDR 6.6 trillion to Finance Minister Purbaya; the Attorney General of Indonesia simultaneously stated that fines are expected to reach approximately IDR 109.6 trillion for palm oil enterprises and IDR 32.6 trillion for mining enterprises in 2026. From palm oil to nickel ore, from large joint-venture mines to trader networks, the scope of enforcement is gradually expanding. President Prabowo has stated that the task force has reclaimed over 4 million hectares of forest land, saving the state trillions of rupiah in losses, and that "bolder actions will be taken in 2026."

Enforcement has also been accompanied by controversy. The Indonesian environmental organization PUSTAKA ALAM has questioned the task force’s authority to impose fines, arguing that under Government Regulation No. 45 of 2025, the power to levy fines should reside with the Minister of Forestry. Furthermore, the transfer of over 1.5 million hectares of seized land to the state-owned enterprise Agrinas Palma Nusantara has drawn criticism. Disputes over jurisdiction mean that some penalties may enter review or litigation procedures, introducing uncertainty into the enforcement timeline.

TimeEvent
Early 2025Task force established pursuant to Presidential Regulation No. 5
September 2025Seizure of 148.25 hectares at Weda Bay nickel mine
September 2025Seizure of 172.82 hectares at a nickel mine in Bombana
December 8, 2025Fines imposed on 71 enterprises totaling IDR 38.9 trillion
End of 2025Cumulative land seizure reaches approximately 4.1 million hectares
November 5, 2026Action taken against related entities of Kurniawan

04 Deconstruction

The Broader Context of Tightening Quotas

This enforcement action occurs against the backdrop of a continuously tightening nickel ore supply in Indonesia. The 2025 nickel ore quota was set at 379 million metric tons (wet metric tons). In early 2026, the initial quota was significantly reduced to 260–270 million metric tons; however, due to raw material shortages at smelters, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) opened revisions mid-year, confirming on October 29 that the final 2026 quota would be raised to 290–300 million metric tons. At the beginning of October, ESDM also projected that actual nickel ore production for the year would be approximately 290 million metric tons, exceeding the initial quota ceiling. Meanwhile, official figures indicate that actual 2025 production was approximately 320 million metric tons, whereas SMM had previously estimated actual 2025 production at around 265 million metric tons. The discrepancy between these different metrics underscores the limited transparency of Indonesia’s nickel ore supply and demand data.

The outlook for 2027 is even tighter. Tri Winarno, Director General of Minerals and Coal, stated that the 2027 quota will be lower than this year’s revised level of 290–300 million metric tons, taking into account global oversupply in the nickel market. However, applications submitted by companies for 2027 correspond to potential output exceeding 500 million metric tons. Authorities have simultaneously committed to faster approval processes and fairer allocation for 2027 quotas, confirming that an annual approval system will continue. Concurrently, officially verified nickel ore demand from smelters for 2026 stands at approximately 320 million metric tons. The gap between quotas and smelter demand is precisely why markets are particularly sensitive when trader networks come under scrutiny.

ItemQuantity
2025 Nickel Ore Quota379 million metric tons
2026 Initial Quota260–270 million metric tons
2026 Revised Quota290–300 million metric tons
2026 Smelter Demand (Officially Verified)Approximately 320 million metric tons
2027 Quota Application Potential OutputExceeds 500 million metric tons
2027 Quota Official StanceLower than the 2026 revised level

Note: Quotas are expressed in wet metric tons (WMT); alternative statistics place the 2025 quota at approximately 326 million metric tons. The 2027 application data reflects the situation as of early October and does not represent submissions from all enterprises.

This aligns with MineCube’s analysis on November 5 regarding Indonesia’s 2027 RKAB process: what matters is not how much is applied for, but how much is approved. A new variable has now emerged: whether enforcement actions will prevent certain already-allocated mining areas from operating normally. To bridge the supply gap, Indonesian smelters have continued importing nickel ore from the Philippines; SMM statistics show imports reached approximately 15 million metric tons in 2025. Earlier in the year, SMM calculated that downstream projects required approximately 343 million metric tons of nickel ore. If quota revisions are delayed, Philippine ore imports could rise to 18–20 million metric tons in 2026.

05 Comparison

Recent Spikes in Nickel Prices This Year

Since the beginning of the year, Indonesian policy has been the primary driver of nickel prices. In January, rumors circulated that Indonesia would significantly cut quotas, causing LME nickel prices to surge nearly 9% on January 6 to close at $18,524 per ton. In late April, tighter quotas combined with a global sulfur shortage pushed nickel prices intraday to $19,350 per ton, their highest level since June 2024. In early May, news of plans to impose export taxes and windfall taxes drove nickel prices closer to $19,900 per ton.

TimeEventLME Nickel Price
January 6Rumors of significant quota cutsClosed at $18,524, up nearly 9%
April 27Tighter quotas and sulfur shortageIntraday high of $19,350
May 7Plans to impose export and windfall taxesApproximately $19,900
November 5Investigation of trader-related entitiesClosed at $16,375, up 3.8%

Rallies are often followed by pullbacks. On January 7, LME registered a single-day inflow of 20,760 tons of nickel, the largest daily inflow since December 2019. Consequently, nickel prices fell from near their 19-month highs to approximately $17,895 that same day, indicating that deliverable LME Grade 1 nickel is not scarce. Comparing the current move to earlier spikes reveals that both the magnitude and height of this increase are significantly smaller than those seen in the first half of the year. The decline in nickel prices from their May highs to around $16,000 was driven by quota increases, continued release of smelting capacity, and global supply oversupply. The actions of Satgas PKH introduce a risk premium; without accompanying data on actual production cuts, such price pulses tend to be unsustainable. From the current position, for nickel prices to return above $19,000, it is insufficient to rely solely on enforcement news; instead, simultaneous data showing actual production cuts, declining exchange inventories, and raw material shortages at smelters are required.

06 Assessment

Targeting Forest Land, Impacting Circulation

MineCube’s assessment is that while this operation nominally targets forest land violations, its actual impact falls on the circulation segment of Indonesia’s nickel ore supply chain. An investigation into a network handling approximately one-third of nickel ore trade, even if limited to specific mining areas, will likely make smelters more cautious in procurement. This could lead to phased increases in domestic nickel ore premiums and imports of Philippine ore.

However, the impact on the supply side requires a calm perspective. First, the task force has not disclosed the specific affected mining areas or acreage, leaving the true scale of production cuts unknown. Second, trading functions can be substituted; direct procurement between large smelter parks and mines will fill part of the void. Third, Indonesian authorities continue to emphasize global nickel market oversupply, noting that the rationale for reducing quotas in 2027 is to stabilize prices rather than create scarcity. Historical cases suggest that only a small proportion of seized areas, such as those in Weda Bay, were affected, and extraction was not impacted; thus, the symbolic significance of enforcement often outweighs its direct impact on output.

More noteworthy is the direction of policy. Indonesia is tightening control over the nickel industry chain through multiple avenues simultaneously, including quotas, export taxes, forest land enforcement, and commodity exchanges. President Prabowo has announced that the Indonesian Strategic Minerals and Commodities Exchange will launch on January 1, 2027. For miners and traders, rising compliance costs and narrowing gray areas represent a more enduring change than any single nickel price pulse.

For Chinese smelters with operations in Indonesia, this means uncertainty at the raw material end is increasing. Changes in quotas, enforcement actions, and pricing rules will raise nickel ore procurement costs and drive companies to increase the proportion of their own mines and long-term contract purchases. Macquarie noted in its report that Indonesia’s full-year exports of nickel and nickel products may decline by more than initially expected, and market focus has shifted to the 2027 ore quota.

07 Outlook

Three signals for the future

Tracking Point 1: List and area of taken-over mining zones. The working group previously stated it would regularly update the public on progress regarding takeovers and fines. If large-scale operating nickel mines are involved, the supply impact will be significantly amplified.

Tracking Point 2: 2027 nickel ore quota. Officials have indicated that the 2027 quota will be below 290–300 million tonnes. The specific figure and the pace of allocation will determine the raw material situation for smelters in the first quarter of next year.

Tracking Point 3: Domestic nickel ore premiums in Indonesia and imports from the Philippines. These two indicators most directly reflect whether smelters are truly unable to procure ore. Also monitor revisions by institutions such as Macquarie regarding the projected full-year decline in Indonesia’s nickel and nickel product exports, and assess whether nickel ore trading will be incorporated into a more transparent pricing system following the launch of the Indonesian Strategic Minerals and Commodities Exchange in January 2027.

Controlling circulation is faster than controlling mines.

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